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Introduction 
The overarching goal of the What Works Collaborative is to build knowledge and share solutions with 
policymakers at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and other federal 
agencies. During the first phase of the Collaborative, more than two dozen independent research 
projects were completed on a wide range of current housing and urban development issues. The 
Collaborative has now turned its attention to fleshing out longer-term policy challenges and identifying 
research needed to formulate policy to address these challenges. This paper is one of five developed by 
the Collaborative on different aspects of housing and urban policy.1 The goal of the paper is to surface 
critical unanswered questions for policy research and to conceptualize a research agenda to help guide 
new research initiatives that hold the most promise for moving both policy and practice forward. In 
2012, the Collaborative will then tackle several small scale research initiatives that are deemed to be of 
high priority, can be addressed quickly, and would lay the groundwork for larger research projects.  
A draft of this paper was used as the basis for a day-long convening in October 2011 with 
representatives of the What Works Collaborative, and other researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners to help identify and prioritize unanswered questions related to the housing finance topics 
covered here. The feedback from these discussions helped guide revisions that have led to this final 
draft. A list of convening participants is provided in Appendix A. 
This paper focuses on four critical policy challenges in the area of housing finance that were developed 
with input from the Collaborative during the spring of 2011. The four issues that are the focus of this 
paper are  
1. mortgage lending to underserved groups;  
2. mortgage financing for the evolving rental housing market;  
3. mortgage lending in distressed neighborhoods; and  
4. the role of mortgage finance in supporting investments in sustainable housing.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four separate sections devoted to each of these topics. For 
each policy challenge, the paper addresses the following questions:  
 Why is this a critical issue for policymakers?  
 What barriers and challenges may require public-sector involvement to address?  
 What are key policy levers or private efforts that both research and future policy interventions may 
be built around?  
 What are the key issues where research is needed to inform policymaking in this area, and what are 
examples of research projects on each issue? 
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 The papers are available at http://www.urban.org/what-works-collaborative.cfm. 
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Mortgage Lending to Underserved Groups 
The tremendous wave of foreclosures and profound economic distress brought on by the collapse of the 
housing bubble has led to widespread questioning of efforts to support homeownership for Americans 
who have historically owned homes at lower rates, including households of modest means and racial 
and ethnic minorities. While the foreclosure crisis has all too clearly highlighted the damage caused to 
individuals and communities of failed homeownership, there is a real danger that changes in policies 
and lending practices will go too far in closing off opportunities for homeownership for families who—
under the right conditions—have both the desire and the means to succeed at homeownership and to 
realize the financial and social benefits that homeownership can bring.  
Families and individuals who would like to own a home confront a number of long-standing challenges, 
many of which have been exacerbated by the housing bust and severe recession. Housing affordability, 
while much improved by falling prices and record low interest rates, remains a significant barrier for 
many lower-income households struggling to gain a foothold in the continuing weak economy. Flexible 
and innovative mortgage finance options are one means of addressing these affordability challenges. 
But with foreclosures at record levels, mortgage underwriting standards have tightened substantially. 
While some tightening was clearly necessary from the lax standards that helped fuel the housing bubble, 
there are concerns that the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction, closing off access to 
financing for creditworthy borrowers and potentially unnecessarily raising its costs. There are also 
continuing concerns about consumers’ ability to successfully navigate the complexities of choosing an 
appropriate mortgage product as well as the potential for minorities to experience disparate treatment 
or impact in the mortgage market. 
Finally, the foreclosure crisis has also exposed the critical importance of developing means to mitigate 
the risks that arise after home purchase that threaten owners’ ability to afford their homes. Of great 
importance are approaches to loan servicing and loss mitigation to better engage with financially 
distressed borrowers and to have resolutions available that can help motivated owners to retain their 
homes while also minimizing losses for lenders in these loans. The experience of recent years has made 
it clear that there is room for substantial improvements in loan servicing to support better outcomes for 
both homeowners and lenders. 
The housing finance system is undergoing profound changes driven both by a fundamental revamping of 
the regulatory structures and rules governing the finance system, by a reconsideration of what form—if 
any—a government guarantee of mortgages should take, and by changes in the behaviors and attitudes 
of consumers and suppliers in response to their experiences during the housing market boom and bust. 
Policymakers are currently confronted with a wide range of decisions about both how and whether to 
intervene in the market to support homeownership for historically disadvantaged groups.  
The focus of this topic area is to identify the research needed to understand key issues affecting the 
demand and supply of mortgage credit in the single-family markets going forward, with a particular 
emphasis on issues affecting the cost and availability of credit for lower-income and minority borrowers 
and communities. The section begins by outlining the key challenges and barriers for low-income and 
minority households seeking financing to purchase a home. We then briefly identify the primary existing 
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public and private efforts in this area before framing the broad questions that are of concern to 
policymakers. We conclude by identifying some specific research topics in each area.  
Challenges and Barriers 
Mortgage lending to underserved groups faces a range of challenges on both the demand and supply 
sides. Most of these are long-standing issues, but changes wrought by the housing crisis have in many 
cases compounded these existing challenges. Among the key challenges and barriers affecting efforts to 
extend financing for homeownership are  
 homeownership affordability;  
 risk assessment, mitigation, and pricing by lenders;  
 consumer choice related to complex financial products;  
 mitigating risks after purchase through loan servicing and loss mitigation approaches; and 
 discrimination in mortgage markets.  
Affordability  
A fundamental barrier in lending to underserved groups is the high cost of owner-occupied housing 
relative to income and wealth among these households. A series of reports by the Census Bureau since 
the early 1990s has examined the share of renter households that could afford to buy housing at 
different price levels given their income, debt, and savings.2 The last of these reports was published in 
2009 analyzing data on renters as of 2004 (Savage 2009). Consistent with the findings from previous 
reports, this analysis finds that only a small share of current renters (8 percent) could afford to buy a 
modestly priced home, and even fewer African American or Hispanic renters (3 percent of each group).3 
While insufficient income was a constraint for two-thirds of renters, a lack of cash for down payments, 
closing costs, or to pay down outstanding debts was a more common barrier, affecting nearly 90 percent 
of financially constrained renters. Affordability problems are generally more significant in high housing 
cost areas along the coasts, but can also be evident in areas where there is a significant gap between 
area incomes and even modest house prices.4 
It is true that homeownership affordability has improved since 2004 as housing prices have fallen and 
mortgage rates have reached record lows. As of the second quarter of 2011, the National Association of 
Realtors affordability index for first-time homebuyers stood at 117—meaning that the typical first-time 
buyer had 117 percent of the income needed to qualify to purchase a modestly priced starter home. In 
                                                          
2
 The analysis assumes the use of a conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and assumes that borrowers cannot 
have housing costs (including property taxes and insurance) that exceed 28 percent of income, total monthly debt 
that exceeds 36 percent of income, must have a 10 percent down payment, and must cover closing costs of 
approximately 5 percent of the house value. 
3
 A modestly price home is one that is assumed to be the 25th percentile of the home value distribution among 
owner-occupied homes in the market area. 
4
 The NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Opportunity Index estimates affordability measures for all metro areas. Based on 
data compiled for this index, the ratio of median sales price to median household income is much higher in market 
areas in the Northeast (2.7) and West (3.0) compared to the Midwest (1.8) and, to a lesser extent, the South (2.4). 
Data retrieved from http://www.nahb.org/reference_list.aspx?sectionID=135 on December 6, 2011. 
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comparison, in 2004 the index stood at 78. But this index assumes that buyers are able to muster the 
assumed 10 percent down payment. As of 2007, when the last national survey on household finances 
was conducted, the median white renter was found to have a net worth of only $7,200, of which only 
$1,000 was in cash savings. Minorities were even less well positioned to buy a home, with a median net 
worth of $2,700 and only $300 in cash savings.  
Further evidence of the barrier posed by the need for substantial savings to purchase a home is 
provided by an analysis by the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) of the amount of time needed to 
accumulate savings to buy the median-priced home. Based on the average national savings rate of 5.2 
percent annually, CRL showed that the median household in the United States would have to save for 10 
years to accumulate the savings needed to cover a 10 percent down payment and 5 percent closing 
costs on the median priced home (CRL 2011). Meanwhile, given their lower incomes, the median Latino 
household was estimated to need 12 years to reach this savings goal, while the median African 
American household would need 15. These estimates also assume that all household savings is put 
toward buying a home, with nothing set aside for retirement, education, or other emergencies. 
The CRL estimates highlight the challenge of saving such substantial amounts out of modest incomes. 
Renters have, however, been found to be able to accumulate savings rapidly in anticipating of buying a 
home. In an analysis of renters tracked by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) over a six-
year period from 1985 to 1990, Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1996) find that the level of savings 
among renter households rises rapidly in the year before home purchase. Listokin and colleagues (2002) 
also find that among renters in the 1993 SIPP panel who purchased a home by the end of the panel in 
1995, 93 percent purchased homes that had values that exceeded the amount that appeared to be 
affordable to those households in 1993. Further, a large majority of these households purchased 
housing that was valued at least 50 percent higher than the estimate of what they could afford.  
While the rapid accumulation of cash by renters may indicate that binge savings is possible, it may also 
highlight the important role played by family resources in meeting the down payment constraint. Based 
on survey data collected by the Chicago Title & Trust Company, Mayer and Engelhardt (1996) examine 
the source of funds used for down payments and find that about one in five first-time buyers from 1988 
and 1993 received gifts to help fund home purchase, with the gifts on average accounting for about half 
of the down payment. A survey by the National Association of Realtors in 2011 found that among first-
time homebuyers the share reporting using gifts from family or friends for the down payment was 26 
percent, up from 22 percent at the height of the housing boom in 2006 (NAR 2011). But this 
generational transmission of wealth is less of an option for minorities, who are less likely to have family 
that owned homes in the past and so less accumulated wealth.  
These affordability constraints can be addressed through relaxed loan underwriting requirements 
related to debt-to-income levels or required loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Of course, these changes may 
come at the expense of higher risks of default and greater loss severity for lenders as these borrowers 
will have less savings to withstand financial shocks and there is less home equity to cover the costs of 
foreclosure or absorb any fall in property values. These issues related to the assessment and pricing of 
risk will be discussed below.  
But relaxing underwriting guidelines are also generally found to have relatively little impact on the 
overall share of renters than can qualify for a mortgage. Savage (2009) finds that even lowering interest 
rates by as much as 3 percentage points only increases the share of renters that can afford a modest 
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home by less than a single percentage point. Similarly, relaxing LTV requirements to 2.5 percent has 
about the same impact.  
The limited impact of lower LTV requirements reflects the fact that renters need cash not just for the 
down payment, but also to pay closing costs and to reduce outstanding debts. As a result, Savage (2009) 
finds that cash grants are found to have a much larger effect on how many renters can afford to buy a 
home, with grants of $5,000 increasing the share by more than 2 percentage points. Grants of $10,000 
have much larger impacts, increasing the share of all renters qualifying by more than 10 percentage 
points and the share of minority renters by about 8 percentage points. For this reason, it has long been 
recognized that programs that provide cash grants for down payment assistance have the greatest 
potential for increasing homeownership opportunities. 
Of course, lower interest rates do provide an ongoing benefit for owners in lower housing costs, which 
can become substantial over the life of a mortgage. And lower LTV requirements do provide some relief 
from the amount of savings needed. It may also be the case that while the impact on the share of 
renters who can qualify is small, these changes may still increase the number of qualifying renters 
substantially. For example, while Savage finds that a decrease in the required LTV by 5 percent increases 
the share of African Americans and Latinos who would qualify for a loan by 0.6 percentage points, this 
still represents a nearly 20 percent increase in the number qualifying.  
One other approach to addressing affordability concerns that has gained increased attention in recent 
years is shared equity. One approach to shared equity is to subsidize the purchase price of the home to 
a level that is affordable at a targeted low-income level and to then restrict the resale of the house to 
another qualified low-income buyer at a price that is capped by a predetermined annual appreciation 
rate. These restrictions can be put in place either through deed restrictions, a limited-equity cooperative 
housing structure, or community land trusts (Davis 2006; Caplin, et al., 2007; Jacobus and Lubell 2007). 
These approaches achieve several goals simultaneously: they bring the cost of the home down to a level 
that is affordable, they husband subsidies to benefit future homebuyers, and they reduce the financial 
risk of homeownership by providing greater assurance that some degree of price appreciation will be 
realized given that the starting gap between the market value of the home and the sales price can be 
substantial.  
Shared appreciation mortgages are another variant of this idea, where a silent second mortgage makes 
up the difference between the price affordable to the buyer and the cost of the home. Upon sale, the 
borrower repays the second mortgage principal along with a share of the appreciation in the house 
value. The subsidy is recaptured through the principal repayment and the share of appreciation paid as 
interest allows the available subsidy funding to grow with house prices (Jacobus and Lubell 2007).  
But there are also concerns about shared equity approaches, including how well they work in areas with 
limited growth in house prices, whether they allow owners to realize the full benefits of wealth creation 
from homeownership, and whether the inability to share fully in house price growth would reduce 
mobility among participants (Jacobus and Sheriff 2009). Growing experience with these approaches has 
provided more opportunities for evaluations to assess outcomes from these programs. Evaluations of 
two long-standing programs in Colorado and Vermont by Temkin, Theodos, and Price (2010a, 2010b) 
found that participants did participate in trade-up buying activity, realizing fairly significant returns on 
their investments in these homes. Further, foreclosure rates among participants were also very low (1 
percent or less), particularly compared to foreclosure rates generally during this period. But beyond 
questions about whether shared equity approaches deliver a full complement of homeownership 
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benefits, there are also concerns about whether it will be possible to obtain the significant levels of 
public funding needed to support these efforts at a meaningful scale. 
Risk assessment, mitigation and pricing by lenders 
By several measures, underwriting standards have been substantially tightened in response to the 
collapse of the housing market. The clearest indicator is given by responses to the Federal Reserve 
Survey of Senior Loan Officers, which found that on net surveyed lenders tightened their residential 
mortgage standards each quarter from the end of 2006 through mid-2010. Since then, there have only 
been two quarters when lenders on net reported loosening credit standards, and even then those 
loosening credit only slightly exceeded those tightening credit.5  
One indication of these tightening standards is the much higher share of borrowers through both the 
government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) and FHA that have high credit scores. For example, the share of 
loans guaranteed by Freddie Mac with credit scores above 740 rose from 42 percent in 2006 to 73 
percent in 2010. Over this same period, among FHA loans the share of borrowers with FICO scores 
above 680 rose from 25 to 57 percent.6  
Courchane and Zorn (2011) provide a more rigorous assessment of the risk profile of loans originated by 
20 large lenders from 2004 through 2009 representing a cross-section of prime, FHA, and subprime 
loans. The expected cumulative default rate (CDR) for each loan is estimated using a proprietary Freddie 
Mac model to assess how the risk profile of loans originated shifted over time. Courchane and Zorn find 
that there was substantial tightening of credit between 2006 and 2009 as shown by significant declines 
in the distribution of CDRs for minority borrowers and minority and low-income communities. They 
attribute this tightening to several factors, including fewer risky borrowers applying for loans as well as 
replacement of subprime loans and their various risky features with less risky FHA loans and by general 
tightening of underwriting standards.  
Tightening of underwriting standards was clearly warranted given the poor performance of loans 
originated during the middle of the decade. Perhaps the strongest evidence for the deteriorating credit 
quality of originated loans is provided by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008), who estimate the 
likelihood that subprime loans originated from 2001 through 2007 experienced a serious delinquency 12 
months after origination. They find that even after controlling for loan, borrower, and market 
characteristics, the risk of early default rose every year from 2001 through 2007, which they attribute to 
weaker underwriting. Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy (2008) also decompose the rise in early defaults 
among loans originated in 2005 through 2006 into components related to changes in loan terms, 
deteriorating economic conditions, and an unexplained portion. They find that deteriorating economic 
conditions accounted for most of the rise in foreclosures that was explainable, while changes in loan 
terms and borrower characteristics explained a smaller share. However, they also find that a majority of 
the rise in early defaults was unexplained by their model. In essence, like Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 
Haughwout and colleagues find that most of the rise in early defaults was due to deterioration in loan 
quality that is not evident from observed characteristics and so may reflect the lack of care taken in 
underwriting these loans. 
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 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201108/fullreport.pdf. 
6
 Freddie Mac credit score distribution from annual 10-K filings; FHA Actuarial Review Annual Reports to Congress.  
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But while a return to more prudent underwriting was necessary, there is a danger that the market will 
veer too far in the other direction and overly restrict access to credit and impose excessive risk 
premiums on loans to borrowers that cannot meet today’s more conservative underwriting guidelines.7 
Perhaps more troubling for borrower access is the tendency for originators to impose even tighter 
standards—referred to as lender “overlays”—than required by insurers or guarantors. These restrictions 
are motivated in part by the increased enforcement of repurchase agreements by guarantors, lenders 
and insurers in cases where loans default, forcing originators to buy back troubled loans. Originators 
who also service loans may also be reluctant to take on loans with a perceived high risk of default 
because of the high costs of servicing delinquent loans. For example, FHA lenders have imposed tighter 
credit constraints than mandated by FHA on loans it insures, apparently to reduce the higher servicing 
costs and greater risks of having insurance stripped from loans that become delinquent. While this 
tendency has been reported anecdotally, it is reflected by the fact that few FHA loans are being 
originated with low credit scores despite the fact that FHA only imposes a minimum credit score of 580 
for certain classes of high LTV loans.  
As the mortgage market evolves, the supply of credit will be determined by individual and collective 
decisions about how much risk to assume and how to price these risks by market participants 
throughout the supply chain—including originators, servicers, insurers, and lenders. Each of these links 
in the chain will exert influence over whether and at what price consumers will have access to mortgage 
financing.  
Yet, there are numerous examples of how market estimates of risk have proven inaccurate. As the 
studies cited above demonstrate, the market clearly underestimated the default risk of many loans 
originated during the height of the housing boom. In part, this reflects the fact that the proliferation of 
new loan products and the layering of risky terms in a single loan had no historical precedence and so 
taxed the ability of statistical models to predict performance (Rossi 2010; An et al. 2009).  
By the same token, lenders may overestimate the risks of lending to borrowers with lower incomes and 
weaker credit scores. An analysis by Ding and colleagues (2011) of the performance of CRA-motivated 
loans with subprime loans to borrowers with a similar profile finds that the CRA-motivated loans have 
default rates that are 70 percent lower, primarily because they lack the risky features of subprime loans 
and are not made through broker channels. Broker-originated loans are associated with a higher risk of 
default presumably because of a lack of financial interest in the longer-term performance of these loans. 
The findings of this study suggest that the channels through which loans are originated can make a 
substantial difference in the performance of loans to what are deemed to be riskier borrowers.  
A continuing question is the extent to which education, counseling, and coaching of potential 
homebuyers housing counseling can help reduce the risks of default. Efforts to provide counseling and 
education to both potential and existing homebuyers have a long history of support by both the federal 
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 Beginning in 2008 the GSEs began to assess additional delivery fees on mortgages based on indicators of default 
risk, including loan to value ratios, borrower credit scores, loan purpose, and other factors. These fees can be 
substantial. For example, on a loan for a borrower with a credit score of 680, an LTV of 85 percent, and seeking a 
cash out refinance Fannie Mae would assess an additional origination fee of 4.25 percent of the loan balance as of 
November 2011 (See https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/llpa/pdf/llpamatrix.pdf). These fees may also 
be rolled into the interest rate on the loan and captured by the originator by a premium earned on sale of the loan. 
As a rule of thumb, each 1 percent origination fee would require about a 0.25 increase in the interest rate on the 
loan (http://www.mortgageloan.com/what-kind-interest-rate-can-you-expect). 
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government and lenders (Herbert, Turnham, and Rodger 2008). But for various reasons related to the 
availability of data and challenges in creating a suitable comparison group, few studies have shed light 
on whether and under what circumstances these interventions reduce the risk of lending to higher risk 
borrowers. Collins and O’Rourke (2011) provide a useful survey of studies conducted to date, which 
generally—but not universally—provide support for the efficacy of housing counseling and education.  
There are also questions about the extent to which variation in loan pricing reflects actual variation in 
risks or are more the result of a borrowers’ knowledge of options and ability to negotiate. For example, 
Woodward (2003) found that consumers paid higher prices for more complex mortgage products with 
much of the difference going to mortgage brokers in higher fees. Another study by Woodward (2008) 
found that even among more standard FHA loans there was a wide dispersion in yield-spread premiums, 
likely reflecting differences in consumers’ ability to negotiate. Based on a survey of mortgage borrowers, 
Courchane, Surette, and Zorn (2004) find that nonprime borrowers were less knowledgeable about the 
mortgage process, less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and less likely to be offered a choice 
among alternative mortgage terms and instruments. Lax and colleagues (2004) examine the pricing of 
subprime loans and find that roughly half of the interest-rate premium on these loans cannot be 
explained by higher levels of risk associated with these loans.  
New regulations affecting the amount of credit risk and legal liabilities that lenders will bear for different 
types of loans will play a strong hand in the availability and pricing of loans. But not all of the changes in 
mortgage supply will be due solely to changes in regulatory structures. Even absent regulatory action 
participants in the mortgage market will decide how much risk they are willing to bear and at what cost. 
In developing new regulatory approaches, policymakers need to have a clear understanding of how 
suppliers of credit assess and price risk to appropriately balance concerns about safety and soundness of 
the financial system with concerns about supporting access to fairly priced credit for a broad segment of 
society.  
Consumer choice related to complex financial products 
As the above discussion highlights, even before the foreclosure crisis began, there were concerns about 
consumers’ ability to successfully navigate an increasingly complex mortgage market with both wider 
choices of loan products and wider variations in pricing (see Essene and Apgar 2007 for a review of this 
literature). While the stresses to the housing finance system exposed deep flaws and have altered 
consumers’ understanding of and attitudes toward housing finance at least temporarily, underlying 
aspects of how consumers tend to make financing decisions may or may not have been permanently 
changed. These include focusing on initial monthly payments more than interest rates and loan terms, 
discounting the impact of potential payment reset risks, and looking past home price determinations to 
monthly payments. Credit decisions may well continue to be influenced by these biases in 
decisionmaking, but also will undoubtedly be shaped by changes in the information available to make 
these decisions that are being brought about by recent and impending regulations. How consumers will 
process this new information and how it will affect their decisions remains to be seen. 
A key point in the process for public policy are consumer disclosures that occur both upon application 
for and closing of home loans. Even as the housing bubble was still inflating, there was a growing 
realization of the inadequacy of existing disclosures and a great deal of research to develop revised 
forms to provide consumers with information that is more transparent and actionable (see, for example, 
Lacko and Pappalardo 2007). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is continuing this 
process and is now actively engaged in soliciting feedback and testing new approaches to meet 
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mandates from the Dodd-Frank Act to update mortgage disclosures both upon application and at 
closing.8  
While more effective disclosures should help borrowers improve their mortgage choices, this 
intervention takes place very late in the process of either purchasing or refinancing a home. Much less 
research has been done to fully understand how consumers go about making the choice to buy or 
refinance a home, acquire information about mortgage options, and process and ultimately act on this 
information. Gathering detailed information on the consumer decisionmaking process generally requires 
more qualitative data collection methodologies that are time consuming and expensive, which has 
limited the number of studies examining these issues. To inform revisions to consumer disclosure forms, 
Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) conducted in-depth interviews with 36 recent mortgage customers in the 
Washington, DC, area to examine how consumers chose their mortgage product and how well they 
understood its terms. The researchers found that borrowers initially expressed satisfaction with their 
mortgage choices and their lenders, but as the interviews progressed and borrowers learned more 
about the specifics of their loans their attitudes became more negative. The study’s findings are of 
interest both in revealing the ways in which disclosure forms had failed to help consumers understand 
the terms of their mortgage, but also in exposing the difficulty of gathering a true understanding of 
consumers’ experience using a simple structured survey. 
Other studies that have delved in detail into the mortgage search process have identified how the 
approaches used by consumers can frame their choices in ways that lead to less than optimal choices. 
Reid (2010) conducted interviews with 80 borrowers in two lower-income communities in the San 
Francisco Bay area. Through interviews with homeowners about the process they used to decide 
whether to obtain a loan and how they searched for a loan, Reid identified how many consumers used 
their social networks as sources of information on loans and lenders. But since the social networks in 
these communities were quite insular, this method of gathering information produced limited 
information on loan options. Reid also found that borrowers treated mortgage brokers and real estate 
agents, who were often members of their own communities, as trusted advisors relying on their 
guidance in making loan choices and paying little attention to disclosure documents, with often 
significant consequences.  
Pittman (2008) is another qualitative study of a small sample of 33 primarily African American borrowers 
in Atlanta to examine both how they decided whether to borrow and to then search for and select a 
loan. This study recruited borrowers through two means: partly based on a search of public records in 
areas where subprime loan shares were high and partly from referrals of clients from local housing 
counseling agencies. The study found that borrowers who were not assisted by the counseling agencies 
fell into two categories: those who did not seek advice from anyone about whether and how to borrow 
and those who sought advice from family, friends, or other social contacts. Pittman found that the first 
group generally identified a lender to approach, did not shop, and relied on the lender to frame their 
choices, with all but one of these borrowers obtaining a subprime loan. The second group relied on 
referrals from family and friends to identify lenders, but given the limitations of this network also 
resulted in most of these borrowers obtaining subprime loans. In comparison, the borrowers that 
sought the assistance of the housing counseling agency all obtained fixed-rate prime loans, even though 
this group was similar in its demographic profile. The study highlights how borrowers fall into market 
                                                          
8
 See http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ for the process being used and prototypes for 
mortgage disclosure forms seeking comment. 
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channels matters a great deal, but does not shed much light on the determining factors in steering 
borrowers through housing counseling agencies and thus toward better mortgage products. 
In the current market situation, consumers are facing relatively limited mortgage choices, as the market 
is heavily dominated by FHA and the GSEs. But as the market recovers, there will undoubtedly be a 
return to conditions where a wider range of mortgage options is available. New regulations, particularly 
those related to the qualified residential mortgage (QRM), will create distinct classes of loans that may 
be marked by sharp differences in pricing. A recent analysis finds that large shares of low-income and 
minority borrowers from recent years would not meet the proposed QRM definition, even though a 
large majority of the excluded borrowers had not defaulted during the housing market meltdown 
(Quercia, Ding, and Reid 2012). In that context, the process used by consumers in making mortgage 
decisions can have significant financial consequences. Policymakers need a much better understanding 
of consumer behavior to help develop policies and programs that will lead to better borrowing choices. 
Mitigating risks after purchase through loan servicing and loss mitigation 
approaches  
The foreclosure crisis has highlighted all too clearly the significant risk and the high cost of failed 
homeownership. Prudent underwriting and support for sound consumer choices at the time of purchase 
can help mitigate these risks. But borrowers will always face the possibility of financial shocks after they 
buy that will make it difficult to meet their mortgage obligations, such as the loss of a job, health 
problems, divorce, or unexpected housing repairs (Belsky, Case, and Smith 2008). When these issues 
arise, approaches to loan servicing and the loss mitigation options available can both make a significant 
difference in the likelihood that the delinquency will be cured. For example, Stegman and colleagues 
(2007) analyzed delinquent loan outcomes as a function of borrower and market characteristics as well 
as the specific servicer handling the loan. They found substantial differences in the probability that a 
loan would cure that was related to servicer-specific effects after controlling for other factors. This 
result is consistent with information from the Treasury Department on variations in outcomes in the 
HAMP program across servicers, which can be substantial.9 Outcomes across servicers would be 
expected to vary with the methods used to conduct outreach to borrowers; how collections and loss 
mitigation functions are coordinated; the capacity, training, and qualifications of staff in different 
functions; and the protocols for managing cases and offering options. However, the specific reasons for 
these variations are not well understood and so represent an area where further investigation is 
needed.  
Levitin and Twomey (2011) have pointed to structural factors in how servicers are compensated that 
may provide incentives for these organizations to favor foreclosure resolutions to resolutions through 
loan modifications. These authors argue that because servicers are fully reimbursed for the substantial 
costs and fees incurred during the foreclosure period, and have priority in the payment of these costs 
out of foreclosure proceeds, they have an incentive to pursue a foreclosure. Since servicers must 
forward scheduled monthly payments to lenders while borrowers are delinquent and so bear the costs 
of financing these advances, delaying foreclosure is not optimal for servicers if there is little chance the 
loan will reinstate. Concerns about whether servicers are adequately compensated through regular 
servicing fees for delinquent loans as well as whether they face appropriate incentives to cure loans 
have led to provisions in Dodd-Frank to establish new loan servicing standards. 
                                                          
9
 For quarterly reports on servicer performance in the HAMP program see 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Pages/default.aspx. 
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One factor that has been found to matter in improving outcomes is establishing early contact with 
borrowers. Cutts and Merrill (2008) find that lenders were unable to make contact with 53 percent of 
Freddie Mac borrowers that lost their homes to foreclosure. Further, this study also documents how the 
establishment of repayment plans at an early stage of delinquency increases the likelihood of cure. Cutts 
and Merrill report on a pilot effort by Freddie Mac from before the foreclosure crisis to partner with a 
nonprofit counseling agency to help establish contact with borrowers early in their delinquency to 
develop a response to their delinquency early in this process. The pilot study results showed promise 
that the use of a third-party counseling agency helped increase contact with borrowers early in this 
process to increase the likelihood that homeownership would be sustained.  
Further support for the potential value of counseling for delinquent borrowers has been provided by 
ongoing evaluations of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program (NFMC), which began 
with significant federal support in 2008. Two recent studies of these efforts both found evidence that 
counseling has helped increase the likelihood that counseled borrowers receive a modification and is 
also associated with a greater likelihood that they remain current on the loan after a modification 
(Mayer et al. 2011; Collins and Schmeiser 2010).  
As the foreclosure crisis has mounted, servicers and lenders have extended several options to borrowers 
to help resolve delinquencies—in some cases voluntarily and in others in response to federal mandates 
through the HAMP program. For the most part, the range of options offered, including temporary 
forbearance, repayment plans, modifications to loan amounts, terms, and interest rates, and reductions 
in the amount owed, are not new; all of these approaches were included in formal loss mitigation 
programs offered by the GSEs, FHA, and private mortgage insurers going back to the 1990s (Capone 
1996; Herbert, Gruenstein, and Burnett 2000). But these options were not available to borrowers with 
loans that were not guaranteed or insured through these channels, which accounted for a substantial 
share of borrowers during the height of the boom. Going forward, there needs to be greater assurances 
that all borrowers have access to remedies that can help preserve homeownership while also enhancing 
returns to lenders in these loans. 
In addition to remedies that can be extended through servicers, there is a heightened awareness of the 
need for financial support for some borrowers that are facing temporary losses of income or increased 
expenses from which they are likely to recover but not to the extent that the accumulated deficit in loan 
payments can be made up. In these cases financial support in the form of grants or deferred, interest 
free loans may be needed to maintain homeownership. A long-standing effort in Pennsylvania has 
offered borrowers this type of assistance (Orr et al. 2011). The federal government is also offering this 
type of assistance to borrowers through both the Treasury Hardest Hit Funds and HUD’s Emergency 
Homeowners’ Loan Program (EHLP). While both programs offer the potential to provide critical support 
to temporarily struggling homeowners, there have been various operational challenges in implementing 
these programs. These are also temporary programs and so will not be available to provide support for 
homeowners once they expire. 
In short, the foreclosure crisis has highlighted the impact that different approaches to servicing, loss 
mitigation, and borrower education and counseling can have on the likelihood that borrowers will be 
able to retain their homes. With new servicing standards to be set under the Dodd-Frank legislation, 
there are opportunities to establish more effective systems going forward to support troubled 
homeowners. The experience of the last few years also offers fertile ground for research to uncover 
approaches that hold the most promise for mitigating the risks of failed homeownership.  
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Discrimination in mortgage markets  
Policymakers also need to be concerned about the potential for minorities to experience discriminatory 
treatment or disparate impact in the mortgage market.
10
 Turner and Skidmore (1999) provide a clear 
summary of the forms that discrimination may take in the mortgage market and review the most 
compelling research at the time related to each stage. The key stages in the mortgage lending process 
include advertising and outreach, preapplication inquiries, loan selection and approval, and loan 
administration.11 One of the challenges in assessing whether discrimination in lending occurs is that it 
may happen at any point in this process, which may involve different actors and require different 
analytic methodologies. Another challenge is that there are substantial differences in financial 
circumstances by race and ethnicity which correlate with the factors used by lenders in extending credit.  
Racial and ethnic disparities in the use of subprime lending provides an example of these challenges. 
HMDA data provided substantial evidence that minorities, particularly African Americans, were much 
more likely to obtain high cost subprime mortgages than whites (see Bradford 2002 for one of the early 
studies of this type). However, HMDA lacks the full range of credit variables used by lenders in extending 
credit and so by itself could not be used to assess whether minorities were being treated differently by 
lenders. Researchers from the Center for Responsible Lending addressed this limitation by matching 
HMDA data with other loan information including relevant risk factors and demonstrate that racial and 
ethnic differences in high-cost lending remained even when these factors were controlled for (Bocian, 
Ernst, and Li 2006). Still, the mechanism by which these differential outcomes emerge was not clear, as 
differences in outreach and advertising, prequalification inquiries, as well as the application process 
itself could all contribute to this result.  
A lack of similarly complete data has prevented much research on discriminatory outcomes in mortgage 
lending. The primary exception was a study by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in the 
early 1990s where local lenders provided complete underwriting information on mortgage applicants 
(Munnell et al. 1996). The study found evidence of higher mortgage rejection rates among African 
Americans after controlling for relevant measures of credit quality. While subject to a number of 
criticisms concerning the quality of the data and the methodology used, the fundamental conclusion of 
the study has generally been supported by subsequent analysis (Ross and Yinger 1999).  
A common methodology for assessing discriminatory treatment is through the use of paired testing, 
where matched study participants of different races or ethnicities but with assigned financial 
characteristics that are roughly equivalent approach the same lender to inquire about a home loan. Pair-
testing methods were used in a study by HUD of the prequalification stage and found evidence of 
disparate treatment of minorities by lenders (Smith and Cloud 1996). Another pilot study was developed 
by HUD in the early 2000s to explore discriminatory treatment in the preapplication stage (Turner et al. 
2002). The scale of the pilot was small, but the results also suggested that minorities may be less likely 
to be provided with full information on loan products, to be coached about steps needed to qualify, and 
                                                          
10
 Disparate treatment refers to situations where equally qualified borrowers are treated differently on the basis of 
their race or ethnicity. Disparate impacts arise in cases where policies or procedures that are not based on race or 
ethnicity nonetheless have a systematic effect on minorities and are not justifiable by business necessity—for 
example, if loan requirements relate to income or house values that exclude higher shares of minorities but do not 
have a valid business justification.  
11
 Of course, discrimination in the process of searching for and negotiating the purchase of a house may also affect 
the process of obtaining financing for a home, but housing market discrimination is not treated in this paper.  
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to receive follow up contacts from lenders. However, examinations of discriminatory treatment in the 
mortgage application process itself have been limited by concerns about potential for allegations of 
fraud if a paired-testing methodology were used in filing actual mortgage applications as this approach 
relies on the use of fabricated household financial characteristics.12  
As this brief review illustrates, concerns about discriminatory treatment and impacts in the mortgage 
market are certainly not new. But with significant changes taking place in the mortgage market and 
significant tightening of credit on the basis of factors that are highly correlated with race and ethnicity—
including income, wealth and credit history—policymakers need to be sensitive to the potential for 
discrimination to become embedded in the new mortgage market.  
Existing Public and Private Supports 
Loan products  
FHA-insured mortgages have long been a key source of financing for low-income, low-wealth, and 
credit-impaired borrowers. During the run up to the boom, FHA’s market share fell into the low single 
digits as subprime lending grew and GSE lending to more disadvantaged borrowers expanded. At 
present, FHA has become the primary source of purchase mortgages for buyers with less than a 20 
percent down payment. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had developed a range of affordable loan 
products since the early 1990s to meet their mandated affordable housing goals. Since the housing bust, 
the pricing advantage of FHA loans relative to privately insured loans has limited their lending to 
predominantly higher down payment purchase and refinance mortgages. Of course, there is 
considerable debate about what form government guarantees will take in the future.  
State housing finance agencies play an important role in affordable single-family finance through their 
below-market loans financed with mortgage revenue bonds. Loans made with proceeds from these 
bonds face both income and house price limits. Due to the tax-exempt status of the interest earned on 
the bonds, borrowers obtain financing at below–market interest rates. Before the financial crisis, 
approximately 125,000 loans were made nationwide through state HFAs (Herbert et al. 2005). 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has been another source of below–market rate loans through the 
Section 502 program, which provides both direct lending as well as guarantees of loans made by private 
lenders. Earlier in the decade, the 502 program was mostly a direct loan program that provided below–
market rate loans that were affordable to very low income households and helped about 15,000 
homeowners a year (Herbert et al. 2005). The program received a substantial boost in funding in 
response to the housing crisis, although most of the additional funding has gone to guaranteed loans. In 
FY 2009 about 12,000 buyers were assisted through the direct loan program, while more than 130,000 
borrowers were assisted through loan guarantees.13 Loan guarantees do not provide any interest rate 
subsidies; interest rates are set by lenders participating in the program. But the government guarantee 
against losses from default should result in lower interest rates and greater loan volumes than would 
exist absent the government guarantee.  
                                                          
12
 The pair-testing methodology sends matched pairs of white and minority applicants to the same agent to seek 
housing or potentially to apply for a mortgage with the qualifications of the testers assigned by the study to be 
roughly equivalent.  
13
 See http://www.ruralhome.org/storage/rhs/09yearend/titlecontentssummary.pdf. 
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Down payment assistance  
The primary source of down payment assistance has been HUD’s HOME program, which assisted 
between 20,000 and 30,000 homebuyers a year during the mid-2000s (Carr et al. 2008). Other sources 
of down payment assistance include HUD’s CDBG program, the Federal Home Loan Banks Affordable 
Housing Program, and NeighborWorks America. As of the early 2000s, these programs were estimate to 
assist a total of about 30,000 homebuyers annually (Herbert et al. 2005). Other sources of funding for 
down payment assistance include individual development account programs, state and local 
governments, and banks, although estimates of the volume of assisted homebuyers through these 
efforts are hard to come by.  
Community land trusts 
Community land trusts have been growing in prevalence, but the total number of units developed 
through these efforts remains fairly small. According to the National Community Land Trust Network, 
there are about 200 of these organizations nationwide, providing a total of 5,000 affordable homeowner 
housing units.14 
Housing counseling 
Housing counseling is provided by a broad range of nonprofit organizations throughout the country 
(Herbert et al. 2008). HUD has played a key role in supporting the counseling industry through financial 
grants for service delivery and training of counseling staff. As of 2008 there were 1,800 counseling 
agencies approved by HUD, providing assistance for renters, homebuyers, and homeowners. Of these, 
70 percent received funding from HUD. Overall, HUD and other federal resources accounted for about 
two-fifths of all funding for counseling, state and local governments an additional fifth, and private 
sources accounting for the remaining two-fifths.  
The NFMC program, which channels federal funding for delinquency counseling through NeighborWorks 
America, greatly expanded support for delinquency counseling beginning in 2008 and helped fuel a huge 
surge in counseling volumes to 1.6 million in 2009. Congress has continued to support funding for the 
NFMC program, including a proposed $80 million in FY 2012.  
Since 2008, investors in mortgaged-backed securities and the GSEs also have provided substantial 
funding support through the Homeownership Preservation Foundation. However, there is no 
commitment to continue this funding beyond 2011 at this point. 
In spring of this year, Congress cut all new appropriations for housing counseling through HUD for FY 
2011, and initial proposals for the FY 2012 budget have also zeroed out funding for counseling. While 
the continued support for the NFMC funding will support delinquency counseling, the loss of HUD 
funding means there is no federal support for rental, prepurchase, homeless, or reverse mortgage 
counseling. 
Key Questions for Policymakers 
This section outlines general research topics in this area along with some ideas for specific research 
projects that could be good starting points. The research topics identified include basic research to 
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 See http://www.cltnetwork.org/index.php?fuseaction=Blog.dspBlogPost&postID=1396. 
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better understand market dynamics, assessments of existing and previous efforts to support 
homeownership, and the development of new approaches to addressing the known barriers.  
What are most effective ways to make homeownership more affordable while not 
exposing owners or lenders to unduly high risks of default? 
Homeownership can be made somewhat more affordable through relaxed underwriting standards 
regarding loan-to-value ratios, thereby reducing the amount of savings required. But for many lower-
income households, and particularly those in higher-cost markets, subsidies are needed to make 
homeownership more affordable. Public funding for subsidies have always been limited, but with 
pressure on government budgets at all levels there is an increasing need to be as efficient as possible 
with available resources.  
As noted above, cash grants to cover down payments and closing costs have the greatest potential for 
expanding the pool of potential homebuyers. With minorities accounting for an increasing share of 
young households, and greater emphasis by regulators on lower loan-to-value ratios as a means of 
mitigate risks of loss, the need to address the down payment constraint will become more important in 
the years ahead. But there are concerns that loans that require little cash from the borrower or that 
provide down payments through grants come at the expense of higher risk of default by those assisted. 
High default rates among borrowers who benefited from seller-funded down payment assistance 
programs have fueled this view, with default and claims rates among these loans that are two to three 
times higher than other loans (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005, 2007). But the high default 
rate among these loans appear to be driven in part by other factors associated with these programs as 
the GAO found that default rates among these loans also greatly exceeded the rates among loans with 
other forms of down payment assistance. In fact, other studies have found that foreclosure rates may 
actually be lower among borrowers receiving down payment assistance through subsidy programs. An 
analysis of foreclosure rates for homebuyers assisted through the HOME program found these rates to 
be lower than among FHA borrowers generally, despite having a similar income profile (Carr et al. 2008). 
And a study of foreclosure rates among participants in individual development account programs that 
match participant savings found foreclosure rates that were about a half to a third lower than a 
comparison group of similar homebuyers (Rademacher et al. 2010). The results of these studies suggest 
that the process by which recipients of down payment assistance are screened and prepared may make 
a substantial difference in their ability to sustain homeownership. Yet, research to date has shed little 
light on how the differences in the delivery of down payment assistance affect outcomes. There is also 
substantial experience with low down payment loans through FHA, VA, and state housing finance 
agencies that could be the subject of additional analysis to understand factors that may mitigate the 
risks of default and the severity of loss to lenders. 
Interest-rate subsidies, which are most commonly delivered through state housing finance agencies 
using funding from mortgage revenue bonds, are found by studies examining renters’ financial situation 
to have little effect on expanding the pool of eligible borrowers. Still, in practice this assistance may be 
important in expanding opportunities for ownership on the margin and provide an added financial 
cushion to make homeownership more sustainable. Further, over the life of a loan, reductions in 
interest rates can amount to substantial savings in the costs of homeownership. Yet, little research has 
been done to assess the extent to which interest rate subsidies make homeownership more attainable, 
improve its sustainability, or improve owners’ financial situation. Moulton (2010) examines the default 
experience in loans made through the Indiana State Housing Finance Agency, but does not have a 
16  What Works Collaborative 
comparison group of borrowers to assess difference in default risk associated with the roughly half a 
percentage point lower interest rates on these mortgages.  
Finally, there is growing interest in shared-equity approaches as a means of making homeownership 
affordable, while both reducing risks for buyers and preserving the value of subsidies for future 
homebuyers. There is a growing body of experience and research related to these programs about the 
outcomes realized. Going forward there will be continued interest in examining program outcomes in 
different market contexts, particularly in the face of weak housing price growth. In addition, given the 
deep subsidies involved, there are also questions about whether and how these approaches could be 
brought to a meaningful scale.  
What approaches are most effective at helping consumers to make good mortgage 
choices while not unduly stifling choices or imposing excessive costs?  
The foreclosure crisis has brought heightened efforts to improve consumer disclosures in the mortgage 
market to address a number of now obvious deficiencies. The Dodd-Frank Act also consolidated 
responsibility for both the Truth in Lending disclosure form and the Good Faith estimate in the CFPB. 
Proposed revisions to these forms were put out for comment this past summer. Even after new forms 
are introduced, there will be a need for ongoing evaluations of how the forms and the context in which 
they are used affects consumer decisionmaking.  
But disclosure forms only come into play after consumers have selected a lender and applied for a loan. 
There are a great deal of information processing and decisionmaking that take place before this stage, 
including whether to pursue homeownership, how to identify mortgage financing options, what lenders 
to contact, and what loan product to choose. Since the many choices made before getting to the point 
of a disclosure form of lender are important determinants of the type of financing obtained, a better 
understanding of consumer behavior at this earlier stage is needed to help to shape policies to improve 
consumers’ ultimate mortgage choices. 
Education, counseling, and coaching aimed specifically at the homeownership decision as well as at 
general financial matters have received a fair amount of support from policymakers as important tools 
in helping to better inform consumers and to guide their financing decisions. Relatively little research 
has been conducted on the efficacy of prepurchase counseling. And what has been done sheds little 
light on how differences in screening, content, and methods are related to outcomes. A number of 
studies of prepurchase counseling are currently under way through both government and private 
channels. While these studies will provide some insight into the effectiveness of prepurchase 
counseling, there is likely to be a continuing need for analysis to better understand the specific 
approaches that are most likely to be beneficial as well as how consumers can be attracted to take 
advantage of the services that are available. Given limited funding for these services, it will be 
particularly important to develop cost effective means of providing borrowers with information and 
guidance. The development of web-based systems and telephone-based approaches to prepurchase 
counseling may provide the best opportunity for expanding access to this assistance while also meeting 
consumers’ need for more convenient access to these services. Studies to explore how best to adapt 
technology to achieve greater scale in delivering these services would be valuable. 
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How can we improve methods for assessing, mitigating and pricing mortgage lending 
risks? What impact on access to credit will tighter underwriting standards have on 
different segments of the population? 
How the market assesses and prices risk is of great importance for both the availability and cost of 
credit. As the mortgage market evolves in response both to changing attitudes and appetites for risk by 
lenders as well as to emerging rules and regulatory structures, a whole series of questions need to be 
addressed to inform policymaking: 
 What do we know about how loan products of different types offered to different types of 
borrowers under different underwriting circumstances and different local market conditions 
performed? Are lenders’ decisions about product offerings and prices consistent with this historical 
performance?  
 How have changes in perceptions of risk affected the types of products that lenders are offering, 
how widely available they are making them, how they are pricing them, and how they are 
underwriting them?  
 How has heightened risk of forced repurchase of loans or indemnification of insured loans through 
strict enforcement of representations and warrants affected originators’ approaches to 
underwriting and pricing loans?  
 What are cost-effective methods for screening borrowers who fall into seemingly higher-risk market 
segments based on traditional underwriting criteria such as having lower savings or credit scores or 
higher levels of debt?  
 How might various proposed rules regarding risk retention through the QRM definition, lender 
liabilities through the QM definition, and risk-adjusted capital standards through the Basel III Accord 
influence decisions about what loan products to offer, under what terms, and at what prices? 
 How will rigid, prescriptive standards for defining loan categories through QRM and QM affect the 
use of mortgage scoring methodologies that have been widely adopted in the industry? 
 How have market developments affected how debt investors are making decisions about what 
mortgage products to invest in? Have they fundamentally altered information processing techniques 
and the raw material used in this processing? How might various rules that have recently gone into 
effect or likely will be out for comment during the study period influence these decisions and 
information processing?  
Both quantitative and qualitative studies would be useful for shedding light on these questions. 
What improvements are needed in loan servicing and approaches to loss mitigation 
to better help delinquent borrowers maintain homeownership while also protecting 
lenders’ financial interests? 
The foreclosure crisis has put into stark relief a series of ways in which current methods, systems, and 
contracts were not adequate for fostering solutions to delinquencies that were in either the borrower’s 
or the lender’s best interest. Among the issues that have been raised are these six: 
 What are the most effective outreach methods for making contact with borrowers and getting them 
to work with servicers toward a solution to their delinquency?  
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 What approaches to delinquency counseling are most effective at fostering a successful resolution 
of the delinquency? 
 How should servicer agreements be structured to provide proper incentives and compensation for 
servicing delinquent loans? 
 What are the most effective way to organize and manage the servicing function to handle borrower 
contacts, handle loss mitigation cases efficiently, and process loan modifications?  
 What legal and contractual arrangements are needed for second liens to avoid allowing these liens 
to hold resolutions hostage? 
 What are the most effective ways to use emergency loan funds to help tide borrowers over 
temporary loss of income? 
One key issue for study in this area is how differences in servicing approaches affect outcomes. While 
studies of differences in borrower outcomes consistently find significant differences across servicers, 
little is known about the factors that contribute to these differences. Further study is needed of how the 
outreach, organizational structure, procedures, incentives, and staff capabilities across services affect 
the likelihood of helping borrowers retain their homes and lenders to protect their investments.  
Among the specific topics for study that may be of particular interest for policymakers is the 
effectiveness of delinquency counseling. While there is evidence that delinquency counseling has helped 
produce better outcomes for delinquent borrowers, absent an experimental design these studies are 
not conclusive. More rigorous evaluations of the impact of counseling would help to make a more 
compelling case for public support for these services. But there is also little known about the 
effectiveness of different approaches to outreach to delinquent borrowers as well as the content and 
mode of providing assistance. Studies designed to explore the best approaches to providing borrowers 
with information and guidance are needed to better tailor these programs. 
Finally, for borrowers facing temporary losses of income or high expenses, the availability of emergency 
loans funds may provide essential financial support until the owner is able to resume payments. The 
experience with the Hardest Hit Funds and the EHLP provide opportunities to examine the experience in 
structuring these programs and the outcomes realized.  
To what extent do racial and ethnic minorities face discriminatory treatment or 
impacts in the mortgage market? If discrimination is occurring, what steps are 
remedies are needed? 
One important mandate of the CFPB is to enhance HMDA reporting requirements that will potentially 
make it a much more powerful resource for examining differences in loan approval rates as well as 
mortgage terms. If loan identification numbers are also reported, this could facilitate matching with loan 
performance databases to allow for analysis of loan and servicing outcomes as well. The availability of 
comprehensive data that includes a robust set of household demographic and financial characteristics 
will give a tremendous boost to research into potentially discriminatory treatment or impact in the 
mortgage market. 
Paired-testing approaches have been shown to be an effective means of assessing differential treatment 
and impact by race/ethnicity in the preapplication stage. But given the scale needed to provide 
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statistically significant estimates in different market areas and ideally across different categories of 
lenders, fairly significant federal resources need to be devoted to support these studies.  
One aspect of the process for obtaining mortgage finance that is potentially quite important but 
presents greater research challenges is in the potential for discriminatory outreach and advertising. 
While many factors undoubtedly contributed to the high shares of minorities that ended up with 
subprime loans, differences in how these loans were marketed and how minorities obtained information 
and made decisions about sources of financing to pursue likely contributed significantly to the 
prevalence of these loans in minority communities. Innovative research designs will be needed to 
determine how outreach and advertising contribute to differences in access and pricing of mortgage 
products for minorities. 
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Table 1: Potential Research Projects 
Research questions Potential research projects 
What are the most effective ways to make 
homeownership more affordable while not exposing 
owners or lenders to unduly high risks of default? 
 
 Evaluate alternative methods of addressing the 
down payment constraint, either through 
relaxed loan-to-value requirements, grants for 
down payment and closing costs, or below–
market value sales prices, with attention to role 
of screening and counseling as well as form of 
assistance. 
 Evaluate impacts of mortgage interest rate 
subsidies on ability to buy a home, to sustain 
homeownership, and to lower ongoing costs of 
owning.  
 Examine outcomes of shared equity programs 
in different market contexts. 
 Assess potential for increasing scale of shared 
equity programs.  
 Review approaches used in other countries to 
provide down payment assistance or otherwise 
address affordability barriers. 
What approaches are most effective at helping 
consumers to make good mortgage choices while not 
unduly stifling choices or imposing excessive costs? 
 Conduct exploratory field research using 
individual interviews and focus groups to 
explore aspects of the mortgage search process 
that are poorly understood, with an emphasis 
on identifying points of leverage for 
policymakers to influence this process. 
 Conduct experimental study of the 
effectiveness of different approaches to 
prepurchase counseling, including web-based 
and telephone counseling that hold potential 
for expanding the scale of these efforts.  
 Design and test a larger-scale survey to gather 
systematic information on the mortgage search 
process employed by minority and low-income 
households. 
 Design a pilot program (potentially for adoption 
by FHA, state housing finance agencies, or 
community-based organizations) to test 
different approaches to engage with potential 
borrowers to influence mortgage search 
behavior. 
 Assess impact of new consumer disclosure 
forms on mortgage choices. 
 Evaluate effectiveness of different approaches 
to prepurchase education, counseling, and 
coaching. 
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How can we improve methods for assessing, 
mitigating, and pricing mortgage lending risks? What 
impact on access to credit will tighter underwriting 
standards have on different segments of the 
population? 
 Synthesize findings from existing literature on 
loan outcomes for different types of loans and 
borrowers in different market contexts.  
 Identify newly available loan-level data linking 
HMDA data (both new and historical) with 
additional information on loans, lenders, and 
borrower characteristics (including credit score 
and measures of credit history), as well as loan 
performance and develop research plans to 
examine address critical questions of loan 
performance for different borrower segments 
under different conditions. 
 Interview different types of investors (pension 
funds, insurance companies, banks, hedge 
fund/private equity firms, mutual funds) to 
determine changes in their perceptions of risk, 
type of securities they are willing to purchase, 
and the type of information they now use.  
 Assess impact of tighter underwriting standards 
on ability to qualify for mortgages by different 
segments of the population. 
 Examine state housing finance agency lending 
programs to assess outcomes from their 
lending to higher-risk borrowers.  
 Develop recommendations for pilot programs 
to help repair consumer credit in the wake of 
economic crisis.  
 Assess risks and benefits of nontraditional 
mortgage products that may address needs of 
underserved borrowers. 
What improvements are needed in loan servicing and 
approaches to loss mitigation to better help delinquent 
borrowers maintain homeownership while also 
protecting lenders’ financial interests? 
 
 Evaluate efforts to provide support and 
counseling to homeowners as a means of 
preventing default and supporting more positive 
outcomes from homeownership. 
 Evaluate effectiveness of different approaches 
to delinquency counseling. 
 Evaluate factors that contribute to significant 
differences in borrower outcomes across 
servicers. 
 Evaluate both process and outcomes of 
experience with Hardest Hit Fund and EHLP 
programs. 
 Assess impact of changes in servicing 
requirements and costs of servicing on 
availability and pricing of credit. 
To what extent do racial and ethnic minorities face 
discriminatory treatment or impacts in the mortgage 
market? If discrimination is occurring, what steps are 
remedies are needed? 
 Identify newly available loan-level data linking 
HMDA data (both new and historical) with 
additional information on loans, lenders, and 
borrower characteristics (including credit score 
and measures of credit history), as well as loan 
22  What Works Collaborative 
 
performance and develop extensive research 
plans to examine differences in lending and loan 
performance by race and ethnicity.  
 Develop a research plan to assess the role of 
outreach and advertising in producing disparate 
outcomes by race and ethnicity. 
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Financing the Evolving Multifamily Rental Housing Market 
Much of the attention paid by policymakers and the media to the boom and bust in the housing market 
has focused on impacts in the owner-occupied market. But the multifamily rental housing market has 
also been acutely affected by the dramatic housing market gyrations and by the profound changes that 
are occurring in the mortgage finance landscape. By several measures, the rise and fall in multifamily 
property values was as spectacular as in the single-family market, with prices rising by more than 70 
percent during the boom in the first half of last decade before falling by at least 30 percent in the 
subsequent crash (Joint Center for Housing Studies [JCHS] 2011). The rise in multifamily defaults among 
loans held in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) has also rivaled those in the single-family 
market, while delinquency rates also rose sharply among loans held by banks and thrifts—although less 
than half as high as among CMBS loans. In contrast, loans owned or backed by the GSEs (Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac) or insured by FHA have continued to perform well during the downturn (JCHS 2011).  
During the decade leading up to 2008, financing for multifamily housing largely came from three 
sources: the GSEs, which accounted for about two-fifths of net new funding; commercial banks, which 
accounted for roughly a quarter; and the CMBS market, which accounted for roughly another quarter 
(JCHS 2011). The remaining sources of new funding were scattered across savings banks, life insurance 
companies, and state and local governments.15 As in the single-family market, since the onset of the 
housing bust the vast majority of financing for rental housing is accounted for by the GSEs and FHA, as 
the CMBS market has largely dried up and banks and thrifts have made only marginal increases in 
outstanding loans. With continued high delinquency rates among loans held in CMBS and, to a lesser 
extent, in depositories’ portfolios, government-backed lenders are likely to be needed to provide 
liquidity in this market for some time.  
It remains to be seen how rental housing finance will evolve as the market recovers from the current 
crisis. A critical issue is what form a government guarantee—if any—will take in the multifamily 
mortgage market. More generally, a key question for policymakers is how changes in the availability and 
cost of rental finance may affect the market’s ability to maintain a sufficient supply of good quality and 
affordable housing for an increasingly diverse population of renters. The market has long struggled to 
provide rental housing that is affordable for large segments of the population. There is likely to be 
strong demand for rental housing over the next decade as the homeownership rate continues its slide, 
more young people than ever reach adulthood, and the baby boom generation crosses the threshold 
into their senior years.  
In this context, policymakers will need to consider what public action may be needed to support the 
market—including both market-rate and assisted housing. For assisted housing, there is arguably a role 
for the government to play in ensuring the availability of loans that meet the unique needs of this 
market segment, including long-term fixed-rate financing and enterprise-level lending. Another key set 
                                                          
15
 This represented a significant change from the start of the 1990s when these later sources of funding accounted 
for a majority of multifamily loans and there were concerns that multifamily housing had been unable to benefit 
from greater access to secondary markets (DiPasquale and Cummings 1992; Segal and Szymanoski 1997; Schnare 
2001). 
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of questions for assisted housing relate to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), which is the main 
vehicle for supporting new construction and substantial rehabilitation of subsidized rental housing. In 
response to the significant fiscal pressure at the federal level, there have been several tax reform 
proposals that call for eliminating the delivery of these types of subsidies through the tax system. The 
threats to the future funding of the LIHTC highlight the need to ensure that public funding for assisted 
housing is used as efficiently as possible.  
This section is concerned with mortgage financing for multifamily housing with five or more units. There 
is obviously some overlap with the sections of this report related to lending to support investments in 
energy efficiency as well as lending in distressed neighborhoods; those specific issues are dealt with in 
those sections. The section begins by outlining the key challenges and barriers related to rental housing 
finance. We then briefly identify the primary existing government efforts in this area and conclude by 
identifying the specific research topics that need to be addressed to better inform policy development in 
this area.  
Challenges and Barriers  
The rental housing market faces a number of new and emerging challenges on the demand side that will 
a well-functioning finance system is needed to address. There also several challenges related to the 
supply of financing for certain types of properties or loan types that may require public intervention to 
better support. Among the key challenges and barriers affecting rental housing finance are  
 the growing and shifting demand for rental housing, 
 continued challenge of rental affordability,  
 availability and cost of financing for small multifamily properties,  
 debt and equity financing for assisted housing, and 
 lack of systematic information on property ownership and financing. 
Growing and shifting demand for rental housing  
While homeownership was expanding from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s, there was essentially 
no growth in the number of renter households. But from 2005 through 2010 there has been a notable 
turnaround, with renter households increasing by an average of about 750,000 a year (JCHS 2011). This 
trend shows no signs of slowing as the Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS) for the third quarter of 2011 
showed an increase of 1.1 million renters from a year earlier.  
In the short run, the increase in rental housing demand is being fueled in no small part by the troubled 
owner-occupied market, which is both pushing former owners into the rental market and delaying the 
transition to owning among young adults. But longer-term demographic trends also point to an increase 
in renter households. The echo boom population, those born between 1985 and 2005, is even larger in 
number than their baby boomer parents at the same age. As this group reaches adulthood it should 
provide a boost to the rental market.  
Another important demographic trend that will shape rental housing demand is the aging of baby 
boomers into their senior years. As this large demographic cohort crosses into their late 60s and early 
70s over the next decade, the number of senior renters will increase by more than 2 million between 
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2010 and 2020. This increase will not be driven by declining homeownership rates, as there is no 
significant tendency to shift to renting as households age from their 60s into their 70s. Rather this 
increase will be fueled by the large number of baby boomers in the 55–64 age group who already rent. 
Still, the aging of this group will generate increased demand for assisted units set aside for elderly 
households as well as for conventional housing with adaptations for elderly residents.  
While the existing housing stock will certainly be able to meet some of this increasing demand, with 
falling homeownership rates leading to tenure switches of existing homes, a number of markets will also 
see a need for additions to the stock. The availability and terms of financing for acquisition, 
development, and construction (ADC) and permanent financing will be important factors in the ability of 
the market to meet the need for additional housing without putting upward pressure on rents. The 
availability of financing will also be an important factor in expanding the supply of rented seniors 
housing, which could tilt toward smaller and more scattered properties offering different mixes of 
services according to some industry observers. 
Continued challenge of rental affordability  
While already quite high at the start of the decade, the share of renters facing severe housing cost 
burdens (devoting more than half their income for housing) increased sharply between 2000 and 2005, 
rising from 19.7 to 24.7 percent of all renters. After moderating slightly in the years just before the bust, 
the share then jumped sharply again as the recession took hold, reaching 26.1 percent by 2009. The 
rising incidence of severe cost burdens was not confined to just the lowest income renters. Among 
renters in the lower middle-income quartile, the share severely burdened more than doubled from 6.4 
to 14.0 percent. Housing affordability problems are clearly moving up the income ladder. 
With more households struggling to find housing within their means, the competition for affordable 
rental housing has increased sharply. The result is that very low income renters are having an even more 
difficult time securing housing that is within their means. In 2003, 16.3 million very low income renters 
competed for 12.0 million affordable and adequate rentals that were not occupied by higher-income 
households—a supply gap of 4.3 million units. By 2009, the number of these renters hit 18.0 million 
while the number of affordable, adequate, and available units dipped to 11.6 million, pushing the supply 
gap to 6.4 million units (JCHS 2011).  
Given the costs of land, materials, and labor, providing new housing that is affordable for the lowest 
income households without subsidies is generally not feasible. Lower-income households may still 
benefit from additions to the housing supply for moderate- and upper-income households to the extent 
that increases in the overall supply of rental housing may lead to additional filtering of existing housing 
into a more affordable range. But ultimately if the cost of operating and maintaining housing for low-
income tenants exceeds the rents they can afford the supply of housing at low rent levels will be short 
lived. Absent subsidies to close the gap between the cost of providing housing and what tenants can 
pay, there is a need to lower the costs of operating affordable rental housing. Lower costs of financing 
are one way to reduce these costs. 
Availability and cost of financing for small multifamily properties 
Smaller multifamily properties have attracted considerable attention from policymakers as they 
represent a sizeable share of unsubsidized, affordable rental housing but face a number of challenges in 
accessing capital through secondary markets (Schneider and Follain 1998; Herbert 2001; Schnare 2001). 
Definitions of what constitutes “small” vary. Most commonly, “small” has been defined as between 5 
and 49 units, although in some cases the line has been drawn at less than 20. However, property size 
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may be more appropriately thought of in terms of loan balance as many barriers to serving this segment 
relate to the high costs of underwriting and servicing relative to the size of these loans. In terms of loan 
balance, small is commonly defined as less than $3 million. But since most data on the housing stock 
include property size and not value, much of the available information relies on the number of units to 
define property categories. 
The most recent data available on the characteristics of financing for rental housing are from the 2001 
Residential Finance Survey. These data show that smaller multifamily properties are both less likely to 
be financed and, if financed, less likely to have a fixed-rate mortgage. Among multifamily properties 
with fewer than 20 units about 60 percent were found to have a mortgage, and of these a similar share 
had a fixed-rate mortgage. In contrast, among properties with 100 or more units more than 85 percent 
had a mortgage and nearly 80 percent of this had fixed-rate financing (Apgar and Narasimhan 2008). 
Small multifamily properties also face higher interest rates. While now quite dated, the last systematic 
information on mortgage interest rates is from the Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS) in 
the mid-1990s, which found that properties with 5–19 units had average mortgage rates that were more 
than a full percentage point higher than properties with 100 or more units (Herbert 2001). 
 Among the factors that make it more difficult to lend to this segment of the market are these five: 
 Underwriting costs are nearly as high for small loans as for larger properties, since the same level of 
due diligence is required regardless of how many units a property has, yet the fees generated are 
much lower, making these loans unprofitable for lenders. 
 A large share of small properties are owned by individuals and are not professionally managed. As a 
result, these properties often do not have documentation of income and expenses that is as detailed 
and standardized as required by large national lenders. 
 With fewer units, fairly low levels of vacancies can represent a significant share of income, 
increasing the risks of these loans.  
 Given the nature of ownership and the higher financial risks, the creditworthiness of the property 
owner is often an important factor in underwriting, adding another layer of review.  
 The loss rates upon default are higher for small-balance loans; an American Council of Life Insurers 
study released in June 2001, for example, reported loss rates of 17.3 percent on loans under $2 
million but 4.6 percent on loans over $10 million (Belsky 2009). 
The primary market for small multifamily loans is dominated by a large number of local and regional 
banks. A recent report by Fannie Mae (2011) noted that in 2009, 2,600 lenders were involved in this 
market segment, originating an average of six loans each. The Fannie Mae authors claim that such 
fragmentation makes it challenging to assess counterparty risk and to engage in the type of loss-sharing 
arrangements that are a key part of Fannie Mae’s approach to multifamily lending. 
Small properties are also common in smaller markets and rural areas where national lenders are less 
active due to lower transaction volumes and higher exposure to risks associated with weak local 
economies. These areas will also have fewer local banks as sources of loans. 
There is little debate about the fact that the factors listed above make it more difficult to lend to the 
small multifamily segment. Still, it is possible that the market could be described as fairly well served by 
the small and regional banks that dominate this lending. Information from the RFS show that many of 
these properties operate in the red but continue to remain solvent by virtue of the sweat equity that 
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owners invest in these properties. The lower shares of mortgage properties may in part reflect this 
reality, where owners avoid debt to keep operating costs low. The higher costs of loans may also be 
needed to compensate lenders for higher underwriting costs and default risks.  
Still, the small multifamily segment remains an important concern for policymakers given its important 
role in providing affordable rental housing. With little new construction in recent years in this size 
category, this segment of the housing stock is also getting much older, increasing the need for capital 
investment. Indeed, between 1999 and 2009 the loss rates among properties with 5–19 units was 50 
percent higher than among properties with 20 or more units. Providing more efficient access to capital 
would help better preserve this important segment of the rental housing stock. The falloff in 
development of these smaller properties may also reflect economies of scale in the development 
process, including securing ADC and permanent financing, which favor larger properties. Since smaller 
properties are more appropriate in rural and suburban areas, the limited development of properties in 
this size class may contribute to a shortage of multifamily rental housing in these communities.  
Debt and equity financing for assisted housing  
An obvious area of public intervention is to support financing for assisted housing, and specifically for 
long-term fixed-rate financing (Handelman, Smith, and Trehubenko 2010). Locking in fixed costs of 
capital for a longer term provides valuable financial security for rental properties, shielding them from 
fluctuations in interest rates and the need to periodically refinance in what may be unfavorable market 
conditions. Long-term financing is particularly important for LIHTC properties that need financing terms 
that match required affordability periods and minimize additional financial risks in these tightly 
underwritten deals.  
Aside from government-backed loans, private sources of capital generally do not offer long-term 
financing as terms are dictated by the appetite of different funding sources for interest rate risk over 
different periods. Handelman, Smith, and Trehubenko note that given these requirements, banks usually 
offer 3–5-year terms while life insurance companies are in the range of 5–10 years. CMBS lenders 
provided up to 10-year terms, but this source of capital is now limited. The multifamily market does 
have some advantages in addressing lender risks from long-term loans. For example, prepayment 
lockouts and yield maintenance agreements are readily accepted by borrowers, mitigating lender risks 
of prepayment. Still, government guarantees may be needed to support longer-term financing that 
would be a valuable option for many multifamily properties. In fact, Ellen, Tye, and Willis (2010) argue 
that the GSEs have played an important role in helping to develop the secondary market for multifamily 
loans through the development of products and underwriting standards. An important question for 
policymakers is whether a government guarantee is needed to support the availability of long-term, 
fixed-rate financing. 
On the other side of the argument, White and Wilkins (2011) make the case that there is not a good 
justification for a continuing government guarantee in the multifamily market, arguing that there are 
ample sources of private capital. Perhaps more important, they also argue that there is little evidence 
that low-income renters benefit from the availability of lower-cost, long-term financing that the 
government guarantee can provide. Thus, a key of inquiry going forward is to assess the extent to which 
the terms of mortgage financing affect the rents paid by tenants.  
Another form of financing that could be pivotal in supporting assisted housing is enterprise or portfolio 
lending to nonprofit housing organizations. Since the establishment of the LIHTC, nonprofit community 
developers have come to play an important role in the increasingly complex process of developing and 
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managing subsidized housing. Andrews (2001) describes how these organizations have significant needs 
for working capital to improve overall organizational capacity, provide capital for emerging projects, and 
smooth cash flows in managing portfolios of low-margin properties. Andrews argues for the need for 
equity-like debt financing for large, sophisticated community organizations that would provide a lower 
rate of financial return in exchange for supporting investments with high social returns. Finkenstaedt 
(2009) revisits the status of efforts to provide this type of capital, surveying sources of financing as of 
2009 through community development financial institutions (CDFIs), national intermediaries, and 
foundations. While the availability of financing had expanded some over the course of the decade since 
Andrews first called attention to this issue, the options for this financing remain limited. Given the risks 
inherent in organizational lending and the need to take social returns into account in evaluating the 
return on investment, this type of lending would benefit from government involvement in helping to 
capitalize CDFIs and other intermediaries and to expand the reach of these national and regional 
organizations in geographic areas that lack lenders of these types. 
Currently, the principal means of subsidizing new rental housing is not through low-cost loans, but 
rather through equity provided by the LITHC. As noted above, several proposals to revise the federal tax 
code as a means of addressing the federal budget deficit have targeted the tax credit for elimination. As 
documented in a report by the Joint Center for Housing Studies (2010), while the LIHTC program is 
widely regarded as successful and resilient, there are also concerns that the tax credit is not the most 
efficient means of providing subsidized housing, including concerns about whether demand-side 
subsidies would be more efficient in many market contexts and whether there is a need to better target 
subsidies delivered through the program to make housing affordable for very low income households. 
Given mounting pressure on federal resources, the time may be ripe for an assessment of potential 
modifications to the program to more efficiently this subsidy.  
Lack of systematic information on property ownership and financing 
An overarching issue for rental housing is the general lack of information on the characteristics of 
property owners, their interests and objectives in owning rental property, their property management 
practices, and their demand for and uses of financing. The main source of information of this type has 
come from the Residential Finance Survey, which has been conducted as a follow-up survey to the 
decennial census since 1950, and so only available every 10 years. Due to budget constraints, a scaled-
back version of the survey is planned for 2012. Compared to single-family mortgages, there is also more 
limited information on the performance of multifamily loans to assess the risks of different loan types or 
borrower classes. Given the significant deviation in the performance of multifamily loans through 
different market channels during the boom, analysis of factors that contribute to these variations in 
default would shed light on risk factors in multifamily lending. 
Existing Public and Private Programs  
FHA mortgage insurance 
Through its multifamily mortgage insurance programs, the FHA is a critical source of long-term fixed-rate 
financing through the 221(d)(4) program for new construction/substantial rehabilitation and the 223(f) 
refinancing program. During the housing boom, FHA’s multifamily lending volumes were a fairly small 
share of the overall market as long processing times amid other factors led borrowers to other sources 
of funding. Since the bust, however, FHA lending programs have seen significant growth in volume. In 
August, HUD announced that it had set a new record for multifamily endorsements of more than $10 
million with a month still to go in the fiscal year. More than 1,100 loans had been insured, which is three 
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times the volume of just three years ago.16 The sharp rise in FHA multifamily loan volumes clearly 
reflects the decline of other funding sources in the present market. FHA is also working to update and 
streamline its underwriting process to help keep pace with rising demand. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
As noted in the introduction, aside from FHA, most new funding for multifamily lending since 2008 has 
come through the GSEs after having accounted for more than two-fifths of net additions to outstanding 
multifamily debt in the preceding decade. The GSEs acquired loans both through portfolio purchases 
and a flow basis from designated lenders. Their approach to working lenders differed somewhat in that 
Fannie Mae delegated underwriting to selected lenders but require risk sharing on these loans. Freddie 
Mac does not require risk-sharing and so takes a more active role in reviewing loan underwriting.  
The GSEs offer a wide range of loan products, of varying maturities and terms. They have largely funded 
larger, high-quality multifamily properties but have had some involvement in funding tax credit 
properties and the small multifamily segment. For a period, the GSEs’ affordable housing goals included 
a small multifamily subgoal, which was associated with a higher volume of purchases of small loan 
portfolios. Their involvement in this market declined after this goal lapsed, but Fannie Mae at least 
continues to purchase some smaller-balance loans, mostly on a flow basis. A recent report by Fannie 
Mae estimates that they accounted for 15 percent of the total volume of small multifamily loans in 
2009, compared to a 40 percent share of the overall conventional multifamily market (Fannie Mae 
2011).  
State housing finance agencies  
State housing finance agencies play an important role in providing financing for affordable multifamily 
housing developments through administration of the LIHTC program and multifamily loans financed 
through tax-exempt bonds that provide both a below–market interest rate and a 4 percent tax credit for 
developments where a portion of the units are set aside for low-income renters. HFAs have partnered 
with FHA and the GSEs in various risk-sharing arrangements to help expand their ability to provide 
affordable multifamily financing. These agencies also often administer other housing subsidy programs 
at the state level, such as HOME and Housing Choice Vouchers. Given their mission of providing 
financing for affordable housing, their experience in innovating new approaches to lending, and the 
resources they bring to bear, HFAs will continue to play an important role in the evolution of rental 
finance, particularly for affordable housing. 
USDA, rural development  
Through its Rural Development agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) supports the 
development and rehabilitation of rental housing in rural areas both through direct lending and 
guarantees for loans made by private lenders. Through the Section 515 program, USDA provides 1 
percent, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages for both new construction and acquisition and rehabilitation of 
existing housing occupied by very low up to moderate-income tenants. Rents are limited to the greater 
of 30 percent of their income or a “basic rent” that covers the property owners costs. In FY 2009, the 
Section 515 program largely supported the repair and rehabilitation of existing housing, which 
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 “FHA Multifamily Loan Volume Sets New Record,” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, press 
release, August 22, 2011. 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2011/HUDNo.11-172. 
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accounted for two-thirds of the roughly $60 million annual appropriation. A total of 743 units of new 
housing were financed that year.  
The Section 538 program provides guarantees for long-term, fixed-rate loans made by private lenders. 
The interest rates cannot exceed maximums set by USDA. In 20 percent of cases, USDA subsidizes the 
interest rate to bring down to the maximum rate. Tenants can have incomes up to 115 percent of area 
median, and rents are set to be affordable at 30 percent of this income level. In FY 2009, the Section 538 
program supported the development of more than 2,200 new rental units, or about three times the 
amount developed through the Section 515 direct loan program. 
Key Questions for Policymakers 
This section outlines general research topics in this area along with some ideas for specific research 
projects that could be good starting points. The research topics identified include basic research to 
better understand market dynamics, assessments of existing and previous efforts to support 
investments in these types of markets, and the development of new approaches to addressing the 
known barriers.  
What has been the impact of the housing bust on the ownership of rental properties 
in different size classes as well as the incentives for managing and investing in these 
properties? 
Some segments of the multifamily market have weathered the housing bust well, as evidenced by the 
relatively low default rate among GSE- and FHA-backed loans. Still, default rates have hit very high levels 
in the CMBS market and, to a lesser extent, among depositories. Since depositories’ portfolios include 
most of the loans for small multifamily properties, property ownership in this segment of the market has 
likely been affected by the rising tide of foreclosures. But little is known about how the high level of 
distress in certain segments of the multifamily market has affected ownership of these properties. One 
study in the Chicago area found an elevated rate of foreclosures among both 2–6-unit and 7+ unit 
properties, raising concerns about the impact of foreclosures on the rental market (Shilling 2010). But 
this study did not drill down to assess how foreclosures were affecting the characteristics and 
motivations of property owners. And with limited information on foreclosures among multifamily 
properties, there are no other studies that we are aware of looking at trends in foreclosures in this 
property segment.  
Policymakers would benefit from more complete information on how different segments of the 
multifamily market have been affected by high default rates among CMBS and depository portfolios. 
What are the characteristics of the properties affected in terms of size, location, and quality class? Who 
are the new owners of these properties, and how are they financing these acquisitions? What are the 
implications for housing affordability and quality of this change in ownership and the nature of financing 
being used? 
Finally, it would also be helpful to have a deeper understanding of the factors that contributed to very 
different default experience between CMBS loans, loans made for bank portfolios, and those backed by 
the GSEs and FHA. Would enhanced regulatory oversight or disclosure requirements have reduced 
default risks in these market segments? 
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What are the sources of both permanent and ADC financing for rental properties in 
different size classes? How are these sources likely to change in coming years? What 
are the implications for housing quality and affordability? What types of loan 
products are missing from the market, and what types of action are needed to foster 
a market for these products? 
At present, most new lending for multifamily housing is coming through the GSEs and FHA. While these 
channels may be able to serve most segments of the market well for the time being, other segments not 
well served by these sources may be struggling to obtain financing. In general, information on the 
sources and characteristics of credit for rental housing of different types is hard to come by, with the 
most comprehensive information from the Residential Finance Survey now 10 years old. While a new 
Rental Housing Finance Survey (RHFS) is in the planning stages, any information that will come from this 
effort will not materialize for several years. Meanwhile, efforts to gather better information on the 
sources of credit for different types of properties as well as perceptions of shortages in credit by 
property owners would help to paint a better picture of the current state of supply and demand for 
rental finance. Once data from the 2012 RHFS are available, they will provide an opportunity for analysis 
of sources and characteristics of mortgage financing by property size and owner type. But since these 
data will not be available for several years, in the meantime case studies across a range of market types 
(e.g., by size and growth rate) would shed light on issues that are likely evident in areas around the 
country. As described above, areas of particular concern that could be a focus of these studies are with 
regard to small multifamily properties, ACD financing, long-term fixed-rate financing, and portfolio or 
enterprise financing for nonprofit community development organizations.  
What impact will changes in the nature or availability of government guarantees 
have on the cost and availability of credit for different classes of rental properties? 
How can existing subsidies be used more efficiently in response to greater pressure 
on the federal budget? 
Reviews of the role of government guarantees in the mortgage market mostly focus on the impacts 
these changes will have on the owner-occupied market, yet, as several reviews have noted, the 
implications of these changes for multifamily housing are likely to be as significant (Handelman et al. 
2010; Ellen et al. 2010). It is true that many properties financed by the GSEs are large, high-quality 
properties in prime locations and so would likely have other financing options available. But the GSEs 
provide a range of product types, including long-term loans, that may not be readily available from other 
sources. The GSEs also provide financing for other underserved market segments, including affordable 
housing and, to some degree, small properties. The GSEs’ role as countercyclical lenders has clearly been 
of great importance in the current market. As policymakers assess options for government guarantees 
going forward, assessments of the impact of the GSEs involvement on the cost and availability of 
credit—and the impact of this financing on the ultimate affordability of rental housing—will help inform 
this policy debate.  
More generally, there is a need to reassess the current forms of federal subsidies, such as through the 
LIHTC and HOME, to determine if there are opportunities to make more efficient use of these resources 
to address housing affordability challenges.  
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Table 2: Potential Research Projects 
Research questions Potential research projects 
What has been the impact of the housing bust on the 
ownership of rental properties in different size classes 
as well as the incentives for managing and investing in 
these properties? 
 Field descriptive research on multifamily 
property turnover around foreclosures. Select 
study sites where a range of multifamily 
property types are likely to have been affected 
and identify who is buying distressed assets, the 
financial products and strategies they are using, 
their stated investment intentions, and to 
extent possible their investment track records.  
 Using data from FHA and the GSEs coupled 
with data from CMBS pools, analyze the 
performance of multifamily loans to enhance 
understanding of risk factors by loan and 
property characteristics that contributed to 
divergence in default risks in these market 
segments. 
How are sources of both permanent and ADC 
financing for rental properties in different size classes 
changing? What are the implications for housing quality 
and affordability? 
 Using available data from HMDA, industry 
surveys, and the Flow of Funds, analyze changes 
in the sources of financing for different 
multifamily segments in recent years. 
 Field a limited survey in selected markets to 
property owners of different property classes 
to gather information of their sources and use 
of financing to augment the upcoming 2012 
RFS. 
 Review loan options in selected markets 
through national, regional, and local lenders and 
how these options have changed in recent 
years.  
 Assess current conditions related to the supply 
and demand for portfolio and enterprise-level 
financing and the potential role for government 
in developing this market. 
What impact will changes in the nature or availability 
of government guarantees have on the cost and 
availability of credit for different classes of rental 
properties? 
 Undertake a detailed review of the types of 
properties financed through the GSEs as well as 
the types of loan products offered compared to 
the broader market.  
 Analyze the potential impact of the availability 
of lower-cost and longer-term financing on 
rents—how much of the benefit of reduced 
level and variability in financing costs is passed 
along in the form of lower rents? 
 Assess opportunities for more efficient use of 
subsidies through LIHTC program. 
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Mortgage Lending in Distressed Neighborhoods  
Few areas of the country have been left untouched by the tidal wave of foreclosures that has swept 
across the country since 2007. Still, a fairly small number of neighborhoods have borne the full brunt of 
the crisis. Based on data from CoreLogic, nearly half of the 3.5 million foreclosures from 2008 to 2010 
took place in 10 percent of the nation’s 65,000 census tracts, the common definition of a neighborhood 
for statistical purposes (JCHS 2011). Many of the most heavily impacted neighborhoods are in the states 
where the housing boom and bust were most dramatic, including Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, 
and Nevada. But Michigan, which did not experience a housing boom, is also among the six states with 
the highest overall foreclosure rates. And while neighborhood foreclosure rates were generally much 
higher in this small group of states, low-income, predominantly minority neighborhoods throughout the 
country had foreclosure rates that rivaled those in the most impacted states (JCHS 2011).  
In short, the foreclosure crisis has both created a new class of distressed neighborhoods in markets that 
had been experiencing strong growth and exacerbated conditions in market areas that had already been 
struggling with long-term decline (Follain 2010; Williams and Weinheimer 2011). Of course, there are 
also metropolitan areas where the overall market has been growing, but there are still pockets of 
distress marked by high concentrations of empty homes and under-maintained housing. Foreclosures 
may impose significant costs on surrounding neighborhoods in the form of lower property values and 
higher crime rates (Schuetz, Been, and Ellen 2008; Immergluck and Smith 2006a, 2006b) and place 
strains on municipal budgets (Apgar and Duda 2005).  
The public has a strong interest in how private capital is flowing into communities with distressed 
housing markets and in correcting market failures in these communities. A priority for policymakers over 
the next few years should be to craft policies that bring a flow of both public and private capital into 
these neighborhoods in ways that help stabilize them and put them on a path to recovery.  
But lending and investing in these distressed areas poses unique challenges. Falling or at best stagnating 
prices makes lending in these areas a risky proposition. Financing may further be constrained by 
difficulties in appraising properties in areas where distressed sales dominate transactions. Yet, a lack of 
financing by itself can contribute to a neighborhood’s downward spiral or at the least block the path to 
recovery. An analysis of HMDA data from 2010 by Avery and his colleagues (2011) finds that the volume 
of lending in census tracts with the highest rating of distress used in the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP) have seen the steepest declines in lending volumes since the peak, down 72 percent 
since 2005 compared to 47 percent in the neighborhoods with the lowest distress rating.  
But in some neighborhoods constraints on access to finance may also be less of a problem than a lack of 
demand for residential properties by occupants and investors with a long-term interest in these 
communities. In those cases, there are likely to be broader benefits to the surrounding community from 
investments in individual properties, providing justification for government subsidies to prop up demand 
as part of strategy to stabilize and revitalize the neighborhood. However, in many cases there may be 
limited demand to prop up, so strategies to reduce the size of the existing housing stock may be more 
appropriate. In other cases, there may be active demand by investors but primarily with short-term 
strategies that are not in the best longer-term interests of the surrounding community, requiring 
regulatory interventions to ensure that these owners do not contribute to further destabilization. 
Investors with longer-term horizons may also be stymied by a lack of access to traditional financing 
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channels that are often limited to owner-occupants. Finally, there are also many situations where public 
intervention is needed to help remove liens and clear up clouded titles, either as part of a process of 
rehabbing and returning properties to productive use or as a part of a land-banking strategy. But to craft 
effective approaches tailored to this range of market circumstances, policymakers need a clear 
understanding of market conditions and of lessons learned from past and existing approaches.  
This section focuses of the challenges of bringing mortgage finance and other capital for residential 
properties located in distressed neighborhoods, with particular emphasis on the roles the public and 
nonprofit sectors should play both to harness and control activities by private investors and to address 
barriers that the private sector cannot. The focus in this section is distinct from the issue of extending 
credit to borrowers who have trouble meeting standard underwriting criteria related to the borrowers’ 
income, debt, savings, or creditworthiness. Issues related to borrower-specific—as opposed to 
neighborhood-specific—barriers are addressed in the first section of this report.  
The section begins by outlining the key challenges and barriers to lending and investing in housing in 
distressed neighborhoods. We then briefly identify the primary existing efforts to address these barriers 
and conclude by identifying the specific research topics that need to be addressed to better inform 
policy development in this area.  
Challenges and Barriers  
Various factors impede lending and investing in residential properties in distressed neighborhoods 
where a policy response is likely needed. An understanding of these barriers is a necessary first step 
toward designing policy interventions to help develop this market. We have identified five main factors 
that impede the flow of capital into these neighborhoods that are described in more detail below:  
 high volumes of REO and abandoned properties; 
 lack of demand for residential properties; 
 falling or stagnating residential property values; and 
 challenges in financing and managing one- to four-unit investor-owned properties; and 
 difficulty of property appraisals in thin markets. 
High volumes of REO and abandoned properties 
As the foreclosure crisis mounted, the volume of properties taken back by lenders—real estate owned, 
or REO—has risen dramatically. REO properties are often in poor condition, and so exert a blighting 
influence on the surrounding neighborhood. REO sales also have a significant negative effect on 
surrounding property values as they are consistently found to sell at a discount relative to other 
properties, for reasons that include poor property conditions, greater motivation to sell by lenders 
seeking to minimize the costs of owning and managing vacant properties, and higher risks of purchasing 
properties coming out of a foreclosure process (Pennington-Cross 2006; Lee 2010; Immergluck 2012). 
REO properties may continue to have a negative impact on the surrounding neighborhood after sale if 
the new owners pursue strategies to earn profits that entail mothballing the property waiting for the 
market to recover or milking the property by renting it out after making little or no attempt to address 
deficiencies. To counter the potentially negative impact of these strategies, public or nonprofit entities 
may attempt to gain control of REO properties to improve their condition and assure their stable 
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occupancy. But a significant challenge facing these efforts is that the ownership of these properties is 
highly fragmented across a number of lenders, often with a lack of clear information about the servicer 
who actually controls the management and disposition of the property. These barriers make it difficult 
for these efforts to identify owners and negotiate purchases (Nickerson 2010).  
Perhaps more challenging than REO properties owned by financial institutions are abandoned 
properties. While many REO properties may have sufficient value to attract owner-occupants or 
investors who will move quickly to reoccupy the properties, at the other end of the spectrum are 
properties with limited appeal either because of their poor condition, weak location, or clouded title. 
Abandoned properties may arise where owners have walked away from properties they owned free and 
clear as they have no further market value. This issue may be more likely to occur in the wake of the 
foreclosure crisis among very low-valued properties that were purchased by speculative investors. In a 
study of outcomes of REO sales in Cleveland, Coulton, Schramm, and Hirsh (2010) found that the lower 
the REO sale price, the higher the likelihood that the property would subsequently be vacant and 
delinquent on its property taxes. An analysis of foreclosed properties in Cleveland also found that these 
homes were much more likely to experience prolonged periods of vacancy for up to four years 
compared to nondistressed home sales, and that these elevated vacancy rates were much higher in 
high-poverty neighborhoods (Whitaker 2011). 
Abandonment also occurs where lenders do not complete foreclosure proceedings in order to avoid 
taking ownership of the poor properties and their associated liabilities. Local communities can pursue 
various strategies to try to better manage these abandoned properties, including stricter building code 
enforcement, increased reporting requirements for property owners, and increased fees for regulatory 
actions (Mallach 2010).  
From a financing point of view, among the key challenges with abandoned properties are obstacles that 
limit efforts to reposition these properties with new owners (Alexander 2011). For example, 
accumulated tax liens may exceed the property value, making the cost of acquisition prohibitive. The 
title to these properties may be clouded by a lack of proper documentation of previous transactions, 
including tax foreclosures and property inheritance. With these barriers to resale of these properties, 
abandoned properties continue to deteriorate and sit vacant, blighting the surrounding neighborhood. 
Public intervention is needed to help clear up these ownership issues and speed the process of gaining 
control of these properties, ideally to transfer to owners who will rehabilitate or redevelop these 
properties or at least to remove the dilapidated structures and hold the land for future use.  
One response to the issue of high incoming volumes of REO is for public entities to intervene to acquire 
distressed loans in targeted areas to gain leverage over these properties before they are foreclosed and 
become abandoned. One example of this approach is the Community Asset Preservation Corporation 
(CAPC) in New Jersey (Simon 2010). Using funding from a number of nonprofits and mission-driven 
sources, CAPC purchased a portfolio of 47 distressed loans from a single lender, most of which were in 
Newark and bordering cities. A disposition strategy was developed for each home, including resale to 
owner-occupants, nonprofit developers that would rehab and manage the properties, or demolition. 
Another example is the Stabilizing Urban Neighborhoods (SUN) initiative of Boston Community Capital 
where foreclosed but still occupied properties are purchased as REO from lenders and then resold or 
leased to the existing occupants (Cherry and Hanrratty 2010). Boston Community Capital provides the 
funding both for the initial acquisition and for the long-term permanent financing. The program takes 
advantage of the steep fall in housing prices in the target areas to be able to reposition the property as 
affordable for existing occupants. The program identifies target properties by first connecting with the 
Critical Housing Finance Challenges for Policymakers 41 
occupants and determining their ability to afford the repositioned property. A similar approach is being 
developed by Mercy Housing that seeks to buy distressed loans out of lenders portfolios at a discount 
reflecting current market values. Community-based organizations with then provide counseling to 
existing owners to position them to successfully manage deeply modified loans.17  
With regard to both foreclosed and abandoned properties, a key part of the challenge facing 
communities is the difficulty of developing responses that can be scaled to match the magnitude of the 
problem. In part this reflects the difficulty of identifying and negotiating with a diffuse set of lenders and 
property owners. It also reflects the significant costs associated with acquisition and rehabilitation of a 
large volume of real estate. Responding to the crisis has also been hampered by limited organizational 
capacity on the part of both government and nonprofit organizations to take on the roles needed, 
although this capacity has been growing with the support of funding from both government and 
philanthropic channels. 
Lack of demand for residential properties  
Given that high levels of residential vacancy and abandonment are a defining characteristic of distressed 
neighborhoods, a fundamental challenge for these neighborhoods is a lack of sufficient demand to 
occupy the existing stock and to support adequate upkeep of these properties. However, the prospects 
for distressed neighborhoods will vary with the broader market dynamics at work in the metropolitan 
areas in which these neighborhoods are located (Mallach 2009).  
Foreclosures have spiked in a number of market areas that have had generally strong housing demand 
up until the crash. In these areas there may be an expectation that demand will be restored over the 
next few years, attracting investors who are willing to wait several years for a payoff when the market 
recovers. In this case there may not be a total lack of demand, but rather a lack of demand specifically 
from households and property owners with a longer-term horizon who would be more likely to invest in 
these properties and provide stability to the neighborhood. Depending on market circumstances, 
investors may have incentive to maintain these properties, but are likely to only undertake the minimum 
amount needed to maintain marketability to renters and subsequent buyers. 
But in other market areas, primarily in the Northeast and Midwest, the lack of demand may reflect a 
long-term trend of slow household growth in the broader market area and a hollowing out of older, 
urban neighborhoods. But even neighborhoods located in faster-growth markets may be cut off from 
broader housing demand by the quality of public services, being inaccessible to other parts of the 
market area offer employment opportunities, or having high shares of antiquated and poor quality 
housing. The poor long-term prospects for these areas may deter owner-occupants from purchasing in 
these areas. Investors may be drawn to buy properties if they are available at prices that are sufficiently 
low to provide a reasonable return from market rents over a fairly short time frame. But there will be 
little incentive to invest in these properties. In these markets there may be little hope of a recovery in 
demand absent a significant intervention to change the market dynamic at work in the neighborhood, 
which may entail public investments in transportation, infrastructure, and public services. 
In the case of areas suffering from long-term distress, there will often be a need for the public sector to 
help stabilize the market through property acquisition, rehabilitation or demolition, and management of 
properties or land over time. In some cases the process may be focused on assembling contiguous 
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parcels and strategically reducing the overall housing stock to ultimately support a long-term 
redevelopment strategy. Land banking is one approach for carrying out this process (Alexander 2011).  
In cases where there is more demand for housing in these areas, but a gap between market prices and 
the cost of providing this housing, public funds may be used to provide subsidies to close this gap. In 
areas where there is investor demand for holding properties, the use of subsidies may be needed to give 
a competitive edge to owners with a long-term interest in the community. These subsidies may take the 
form of grants, forgivable loans or loans with below–market interest rates offered in targeted 
geographic areas. Public funds may also subsidize the acquisition and development process to make up 
the different between the market value of the housing and the total cost of acquisition and 
rehabilitation or new construction. Another approach for delivering these subsidies could be tax credits 
along the lines of the low income housing tax credit or historic preservation credits, where the subsidy 
comes with obligations to meet long-term affordability provisions.  
But in order to craft the most appropriate interventions, local governments need an honest appraisal of 
the prospects for revitalizing individual neighborhoods in the context of broader market conditions and 
trends. This requires a careful consideration of the neighborhoods’ assets—both physical and social—
and the likelihood that given these attributes there is the potential for renewed demand for homes in 
this area with appropriate investment of public funds. One of the common failings of interventions 
developed through NSP is paying insufficient attention to the strength of demand for homes supported 
through these efforts, with few takers for homes ready for occupancy. This may reflect poor conditions 
in the neighborhood, or outdated forms of housing that no longer hold appeal for homebuyers unless 
substantially reconfigured. There are also concerns about whether it is appropriate to lure low-income 
homes into severely distressed neighborhoods through the use of significant per unit subsidies, both 
because of the negative impacts on these households from living in these areas and because the high 
level of subsidies may be inefficient use of this scarce resource. In areas of relatively strong demand 
there may also be a tendency for the public sector to be in competition with private investors for the 
properties best positioned for rehabilitation. In these markets, the public sector may want to develop 
approaches that both harness and complement the activities of these private investors, rather than 
compete with them. In short, the development of neighborhood typologies based on market conditions 
as they relate to the prospects for revitalization both with and without public intervention could help 
local governments to determine when to employ different strategies.  
Falling or stagnating residential property values  
In some situations there may be at least modest demand for housing in distressed areas, but this 
demand may be chilled by the expectation that house prices may continue to fall or at least have little 
hope of rising. Buyers will be reluctant to purchase or to invest in homes out of fear that they will be 
unable to recoup their investments or make a modest return. Similarly, lenders will be reluctant to make 
loans in these areas due to the higher risk of default and significant loss severities. By dampening 
investments in these areas, these expectations of falling or stagnating prices can become self-fulfilling.  
To some extent, demand subsidies may address this issue by providing a financial incentive for buyers to 
move to these areas and providing some hedge against possible financial losses. A more direct response 
to the problem of self-fulfilling expectations of price declines is home equity insurance, where owners 
are provided a guarantee against neighborhood specific declines in prices. The advent of home price 
indexes available at lower levels of geography provide the basis for such insurance approaches. One 
well-known example was a pilot project in Syracuse, New York, begun in the late 1990s (Caplin et al. 
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2003). While it was only a small-scale pilot, there may be valuable lessons to be distilled from this 
experience.  
Shared-equity or shared-appreciation homeownership programs are another way to provide buyers with 
insurance against declines in property values (Carr and Mulcahy 2010). One variation of these 
approaches is to offer buyers low–interest rate loans or soft second loans that are repaid in part by 
sharing any property appreciation upon sale. If the home does not appreciate, the owner has no 
obligation to make up the difference in the interest rate or pay any interest on the second mortgage. 
Another variant is subsidy-retention programs, which may take the form of community land trust, 
limited equity cooperatives, or deed restrictions. In this approach, buyers pay a below-market price for 
the home but are limited to resale prices that provides a predetermined maximum annual return. The 
larger the difference between the market value and the sales prices, the greater the likelihood that the 
buyer will realize the agreed-upon annual return. Of course, in areas with depressed values and a 
likelihood of little future growth, homebuyers may be shielded from a loss of equity but will also face 
limited opportunities for increases in value. For this reason, shared-equity approaches would probably 
make more sense in areas that are not in market areas experiencing a long-term decline. 
On the other hand, to address the risks faced by lenders from a potential fall in home prices, loan 
guarantees or mortgage insurance may be employed. However, to the extent that the risks of default 
from falling home prices—or other factors associated with the neighborhood—are elevated, the break-
even fees associated with these guarantees may be prohibitively high. This type of risk assurance will 
make sense, however, in cases where market perceptions of risk overstate the true risks—particularly if 
financing is available to support demand and halt a downward slide in property values. 
Challenges in financing and managing one- to four-unit investor-owned properties  
In areas hard hit by the foreclosure crisis, much of the housing stock is in two- to four-unit properties. 
While much of this stock has always been non–owner occupied, the foreclosure crisis has increased the 
share of these units owned by investors. Single-family homes have also have increasingly shifted into the 
rental housing stock. Between 2007 and 2009 alone, 1.4 million single-family homes switched from 
owner to renter occupied (JCHS 2011).  
The financial position of these small rental properties even before the financial crisis was precarious as 
the challenges facing these properties are substantial. They generally garner low rents, have high 
turnover, and are older housing with high maintenance needs. A recent study using the 2001 Residential 
Finance Survey found that only 5 percent of one- to four-unit rental properties were financially 
profitable (Garboden and Newman 2011), while at the other end of the spectrum 30 percent of these 
properties could not cover debt service and maintenance even when fully rented. In between were 65 
percent of properties that were not generating a positive cash flow at present but had the potential to 
do so, primarily if vacancies were reduced.  
Given the financial challenges facing these properties, it is no wonder that they pose particular 
challenges for lenders. In cases where the properties are not owner occupied, there is the added risk 
that investor-owners may not be as motivated to maintain these properties and be more likely to walk 
away if the property begins to generate losses. Property owners, on the other hand, face limited 
borrowing options, particularly since the FHA does not insure one- to four-unit properties that are not 
owner occupied. The housing bust has further exacerbated access to lending in these areas as much of 
the lending in these neighborhoods had come through mortgage brokers—a market channel that has 
substantially declined. To the extent that financing is available, it is likely to come with higher interest 
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rates, making it more difficult for the property to break even financially. In addition to difficulty in 
accessing financing, these owners are often ineligible for grant and low-cost loan programs that are 
limited to owner-occupants.  
There may be good reason to revisit these restrictions on both FHA lending and other grant and low-cost 
loan programs given the importance of investors in many neighborhoods and the fact that these housing 
units are an important part of the affordable rental stock. Three-quarters of unassisted housing units 
renting for less than $400 in 2009 were in one- to four-unit properties, as were 58 percent of units 
renting for $400–599 (JCHS 2011). As Mallach (2009) points out, investor-owners can be good stewards 
of these properties—as long as necessary regulatory and financial incentives are in place. In fact, a 
recent study of default among loans originated in New York City during the height of the boom found 
that loans flagged in HMDA as non–owner occupied actually were associated with a lower risk of default 
(Chan et al. 2011). While this result may reflect a unique set of market conditions, it does suggest that 
lending to investors may not be associated with higher risk of default—and certainly worthy of further 
investigation.  
One reason that these small properties face financial challenges is that the typical “mom and pop” 
owners of these properties neither have access to the capital needed to maintain these properties nor 
benefit from economies of scale in property management, including leasing (Garboden and Newman 
2011). On the other hand, the properties may benefit from “sweat equity” of owners in maintaining the 
property, which helps support low rents (Mallach 2009).  
The widespread rental of single-unit properties may also be a transitory phase that is needed both to 
restore potential homebuyers’ confidence in these areas and to allow household finances to recover to 
the point where purchasing a home is feasible. Rent-to-own arrangements may be a useful means of 
managing the excess supply of single-family homes during this period. However, these arrangements 
require an entity to own and manage the property during the rental phase and a mechanism for 
transferring ownership upon successful completion of the renting phase. Innovations in financing rent-
to-own arrangements to achieve greater scale in these efforts may be needed. 
A number of papers have suggested creating a portfolio of small properties to help achieve economies in 
accessing capital and managing these properties (Garboden and Newman 2011; Belsky 2010; Apgar and 
Narasimhan 2008; Newman 2005). This notion is also part of the motivation behind the Obama 
administration’s efforts in mid-2011 to gather information on the potential for selling REO properties 
held by the GSEs and the FHA to investor-owners for management as scattered-site rental housing. One 
proposal that has been made public outlines an approach that could be used by a national network of 
nonprofits to achieve economies of scale in terms of both management and financing of a portfolio of 
properties; it draws upon experiences in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (Housing Policy 
Network and RECAP Real Estate Advisors 2011). The proposal also includes a substantial rent-to-own 
component for housing that is well suited to transition back to owning over time, while other units will 
be managed over the longer term as workforce rental housing. The proposal makes a strong case that 
such economies of scale in management are possible—if the challenge of securing a large portfolio of 
properties at a reasonable price is addressed. 
Difficulty of property appraisals in thin markets 
In areas where there is little demand for residential properties, lending may also be limited by the 
difficulty in appraising properties due to a lack of arm’s-length transactions to be used as comparable 
sales. But while the potential for a comparable sales appraisal methodology to drag down prices has 
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been the subject of many articles in the popular press, it does not appear to have been the subject of 
any recent research (Frame 2010). Difficulty appraising properties will impede private lending, but it is 
also an issue for transactions involving public or nonprofit entities where a reasonable market value 
needs to be established. In areas where comparable sales are lacking, there may be a need to develop 
alternative approaches to appraisals, for example based on assumptions regarding rental income and 
expenses. In general, a better understanding is needed of the extent to which appraisals present 
challenges to lending in these areas as well as options of alternative approaches to estimating values. 
Toward these ends, better availability of data on property characteristics and sales transactions would 
help support analysis of these issues. 
Public and Private Programs  
Below are a few of the most important existing policies and programs that address the issues outlined 
above and so may provide opportunities for research or the development of pilot efforts.  
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 
A special component of the long-established Community Development Block Grant program, NSP was 
first established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. This initial program (NSP1) 
provided funding through a formula to states and localities to stabilize communities heavily impacted by 
the foreclosure crisis through the purchase and redevelopment of foreclosed and abandoned homes 
and residential properties. There were two subsequent rounds of funding with somewhat different 
methods for distributing the funds and rules governing the use of funds. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 funded competitive grants (NSP2) that were also open to nonprofit 
organizations, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (NSP3) channeled additional funds to states and localities 
through a formula grant approach.  
NSP provided grantees with a fair amount of latitude in how funding would be used, including for 
acquisition and redevelopment of abandoned and foreclosed properties, establishing financing 
mechanisms for the purchase and redevelopment of these properties, establishing land banks for 
foreclosed homes, and demolishing blighted structures. While not without significant constraints on 
grantees activities, the program nonetheless provides funding for a wide variety of approaches to 
address the barriers discussed above. While NSP is a temporary program designed to address the 
problems brought on by the foreclosure crisis, the experiences of grantees across the country pursuing a 
range of strategies in varied market conditions provides the opportunity to learn about the potential for 
different approaches to promote neighborhood stabilization.  
Land banks and nonprofit development corporations 
Land banks are an increasingly common tool that local governments are employing as a means of 
addressing the problem of vacant and abandoned property. Alexander (2011) provides a thorough 
review of the history of land banks in the United States, identifies emerging uses of this approach, and 
identifies additional tools and incentives that can be combined with land banking to stabilize 
communities. As Alexander succinctly puts it:  
Land banks are governmental entities that specialize in the conversion of vacant, 
abandoned and foreclosed properties into productive use. The primary thrust of all land 
banks and land banking initiatives is to acquire and maintain properties that have been 
rejected by the open market and left as growing liabilities for neighborhoods and 
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communities. The first task is the acquisition of title to such properties; the second task 
is the elimination of the liabilities; the third task is the transfer of the properties to new 
owners in a manner most supportive of local needs and priorities. (Alexander 2011, 10) 
From a handful of efforts in 2005, this study counts 79 such programs across the country as of 2011. A 
key issue for land banks is to establish a source of financing for their activities. Local governments may 
commit funding from general revenues, but this is unlikely to be a stable source of annual revenue. 
Funds from federal programs may be used to fund land bank operations, such as NSP. Land banks may 
also be able to profit from some share of its property sales, which can be used to fund ongoing 
operations. Other options include capture of tax liens along with interest and penalties on these 
delinquent payments or the capture incremental increases in property taxes on these properties over 
time. The wide variety of efforts in a range of market circumstances provides a rich source of 
information on how this tool can be used to address the problems of high vacancy and abandonment.  
Nonprofit organizations can also play a similar role in acquiring, redeveloping, and either managing or 
selling resulting properties as affordable housing. These organizations may receive funding through NSP, 
national intermediaries, community development financial institutions (CDFIs), and private sources of 
capital. For example, the National Community Stabilization Trust (NCST) operates an REO capital fund 
that provides funding for acquisition and rehabilitation of properties as well as bridge financing to 
support transactions where time is of the essence but the ultimate sources of financing are not yet in 
place. The NCST has provided financing to five nonprofit organizations around the country to acquire 
and reposition foreclosed or abandoned properties.18 The experience of these efforts may also be useful 
targets of study to understand the potential and limits of these approaches. 
FHA insurance programs 
FHA’s 203(b) standard insurance for one- to four-unit properties represents an important source of 
financing in areas where lenders would otherwise be reluctant to loans, while 203(k) rehabilitation 
mortgage insurance also allows buyers to finance up to an additional $35,000 for renovations prior to 
move in. However, there may be ways in which the guidelines and administration of these programs 
could be improved to enhance their use in distressed areas. For example, one reviewer has pointed to 
stringent property quality standards that may make it difficult for properties that are in poor condition 
to qualify for FHA loans, with the result that these properties may then be channeled to investor-owners 
(Theologides 2010). The 203(k) program has seen an increase in use in recent years, doubling volume in 
2009 and again in 2010, reaching more than 22,000 loans. A review of the program by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) noted that barriers to greater use of the program include strict repair 
guidelines, a lack of capacity by lenders to handle the construction oversight required, and the length of 
time required to close these loans (OCC 2009). Another concern with these loans is that they bear 
interest rates that are 1–3 percentage points higher than standard FHA loans, raising costs for what are 
likely to be low-income buyers (Treuhaft, Rose, and Black 2010). In addition, as noted earlier, the 
usefulness of both programs is hampered by the requirement that only owner-occupants are eligible for 
these loan products. Both programs offer opportunities to evaluate both the usefulness of these 
programs as well as loan performance in different market contexts. 
                                                          
18
 For details, see “Projects Financed,” 
http://www.stabilizationtrust.com/programs_services/reo_capital_fund/projects_financed/. 
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Shared-equity and lease-to-own programs  
Various shared-equity programs have been developed to address homeownership affordability issues 
that may be adapted to the circumstances in distressed areas. While a number of these efforts have 
been the subject of evaluations, additional research may be needed to assess how well these tools could 
be applied in distressed areas. Similarly, existing lease-to-own programs could be the subject of 
additional research to address whether these efforts could be expanded and brought to scale. Carr and 
Mulcahy (2010) identify several programs, both new and long-standing, that could be examined, 
including a fairly large-scale new effort developed by Self Help and Fannie Mae; a smaller program in 
Waco, Texas, supported by NeighborWorks; and a long-standing program in Cleveland.  
Key Questions for Policymakers 
This section outlines general research topics in this area along with some ideas for specific research 
projects that could be good starting points. The research topics identified include basic research to 
better understand market dynamics, assessments of existing and previous efforts to support 
investments in these types of markets, and the development of new approaches to addressing the 
known barriers.  
What do we know about market conditions, the nature of demand, and sources of 
financing in distressed neighborhoods? How do conditions vary across different 
typologies of distressed neighborhoods? What do these findings imply about the 
most effective role for public and nonprofit actors in these markets? 
One challenge in crafting policies to help distressed neighborhoods is that there is often a dearth of 
information on fundamental market conditions, including the following:  
 What is the inventory of vacant housing in distressed areas, and what is the legal status of these 
properties (i.e., in the foreclosure process, owned by a financial institution, owned by an investor, or 
of clouded ownership status)? 
 How is property ownership in these areas changing? Who is buying properties, and what is their 
motivation and strategy for making these investments? To what extent do investors consist of 
“mom and pop” owners purchasing a small number of properties versus larger-scale investors? How 
does the mix of investors vary across market areas? 
 What are the sources and terms of capital being used to finance purchases? How is the nature of the 
capital being used likely to affect the property management strategies employed by owners? 
 If there are few active buyers, to what extent is a lack of access to capital an impediment? Who are 
potential investors, and what are key impediments to their involvement in the market? 
 How do incentives and approaches used by real estate agents affect the sale of distressed and REO 
properties? 
These questions could be addressed through both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. 
Data on property transactions may provide some information on property sales, including the type of 
buyer and whether any liens for financing are recorded. One strand of research would be to catalogue 
efforts to assemble and analyze these data and to identify opportunities to expand on existing efforts. 
Qualitative information is also needed to more fully understand the nature of transactions taking place, 
involving case studies of neighborhoods facing different supply and demand dynamics. Mallach (2009) 
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provides an example of research contrasting the market dynamics in a previously fast-growing market 
area (Phoenix) with one facing longer-term distress (New Haven). The information gathered could then 
be used to better tailor public interventions to control and harness private investment activity and to 
design public interventions to complement private actions.  
What interventions hold the most promise for encouraging investment or otherwise 
stabilizing distressed neighborhoods?  
One broad class of public intervention is to take steps to foster greater demand in distressed areas. 
These efforts can take several forms, including subsidies to close the gap between development costs 
and market values, down payment assistance, interest rate subsidies, or rent-to-own programs. Among 
the challenges for these efforts are determining the level of demand for repositioned properties and 
determining the appropriate amount of subsidy per property that is most efficient. NSP has provided 
states and localities with an opportunity to experiment with different approaches which may shed light 
on how well different approaches work in different market contexts. Spatially targeted lending programs 
through state housing finance agencies might also provide opportunities for study. Demand-side 
subsidies could also be offered through tax credits similar to the LIHTC or historic rehabilitation credits. 
Proposals for a pilot program could be developed that analyzes financial information on the costs to 
acquire and rehab foreclosed properties compared to the market value or rental income potential of 
these homes as affordable housing to help structure a tax credit that could close this gap. Finally, 
previous efforts to provide home equity insurance also offer opportunities for study. A review of 
experience with these programs (when used in neighborhoods exhibiting elevated vacancies and 
foreclosure) could shed light on the potential use of tax credits to spur investment in existing or new 
properties in targeted areas. 
Another broad class of public intervention relates to repositioning properties that, for various reasons, 
the private sector will not invest in. These include properties that are seriously dilapidated, have 
clouded titles, or are saddled with liens that exceed their value. The owners of these properties may 
have abandoned them or they may be owned by banks that are anxious to hand them over. The arsenal 
of tools that can be employed in these situations include land banks and other means of removing liens 
and clearing titles, code enforcement, property registration systems, and the imposition of regulatory 
fees. Again, the broad range of responses that have been developed across the country to address these 
issues provides fertile ground for research to identify the most promising approaches in different market 
contexts. 
Finally, there have been several emerging efforts to maintain occupancy of properties at risk of 
foreclosure to prevent these homes from becoming vacant and contribute to neighborhood instability. 
These approaches all entail negotiating with lenders to either acquire loans before foreclosure is 
completed or to purchase REO properties immediately upon foreclosure. Assessments of these efforts, 
including both their efficacy in avoiding vacancies and the potential for bringing them to scale, would 
provide valuable information for other areas considering similar approaches.  
What do we know about magnitude of risks of different loan products in distressed 
areas? What types of guarantees may be needed to support lending?  
In general, lending in distressed neighborhoods and to specific classes of properties and owners is 
viewed as increasing the risk of losses on these loans, chilling supply of these products. However, there 
may be little systematic information on actual loan performance to inform lending decisions. In this 
case, a lack of lending may not be an accurate reflecting of higher risk, but a market failure due to lack of 
sufficient information to accurately assess risks. A starting point for investigating this issue would be to 
Critical Housing Finance Challenges for Policymakers 49 
review what is known about the default risks and loss severity rates of loans to investors in small 
properties, lease-purchase programs, rehab loan programs, and lending generally in distressed 
neighborhoods. Gaps in existing information could be filled in through analysis of data from private 
sources as well as relevant FHA and GSE lending programs. The results of this analysis could then inform 
the development of new lending approaches by FHA or the GSEs. 
What can we learn from past and current efforts to stabilize neighborhoods? 
There have been a wide range of historical and recent efforts to channel financing to distressed 
properties and neighborhoods, ranging from the Depression-era Home Owner Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
to the ongoing Neighborhood Stabilization Program. These programs offer a great opportunity to distill 
lessons to refine existing programs and to devise new approaches. Seidman and Jakabovics (2009) 
provide a brief review of lessons learned from HOLC, the Resolution Trust, and HUD’s Asset Control Area 
program. Of these, HUD’s Asset Control Area program may offer the richest opportunities for study, as it 
is an ongoing program operating in varied market contexts. Efforts by the National Community 
Stabilization Trust and other national intermediaries offer other opportunities for research. A review of 
existing evaluations of these efforts would help identify areas where additional research is warranted. 
Some specific issues that may be particular valuable to assess are these three: 
 What is the potential for scaling up efforts to purchase loans or still-occupied REO properties to 
reposition occupants as owners of substantially modified loans? 
 What has been learned about what financing and other steps are most critical for jump-starting land 
banks to take possession of REO properties with limited market value due to physical condition, 
poor location, or clouded titles?  
 What is the potential for expanding lease-to-own programs based on experiences with pilot 
programs? 
What role are appraisal challenges playing in markets at present? Are there new 
approaches to appraisals that may be more appropriate in distressed areas? 
While appraisal challenges are often identified as an impediment, there is little systematic information 
on actual experience with appraisals. Reviews of existing work in this area are needed to document 
what is already known. Cases studies of selected market areas would shed further light on this issue and 
identify issues that may need to be addressed through innovative approaches.  
Would the aggregation of small property ownership create economies of 
management and finance that would better support both higher quality and 
affordability of this housing? What public supports would be needed to encourage 
this aggregation?  
As noted earlier, there have been a number of papers that have promoted the aggregation of small 
properties into property pools to achieve greater economies of scale. Are there examples of scattered-
site property management that could be the subject of cases studies to provide information on the 
extent to which these economies can be realized? For example, does experience with HUD’s Asset 
Control Area program shed any light on these issues? Most recently, the Obama administration has 
solicited input on approaches that could be used to transfer bundles of REO properties held by FHA and 
the GSEs to investors. Responses to this request may identify examples of such aggregation that could 
also be the subject of study.  
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Table 3: Potential Research Projects 
Research questions Potential research projects 
What do we know about market conditions, the 
nature of demand, and sources of financing in 
distressed areas? How do conditions vary across 
different typologies of distressed neighborhoods? 
What do these findings imply about most effective role 
for public and nonprofit actors in these markets? 
 Field descriptive research, including review of 
available data and targeted interviews, to better 
understand who is investing in areas of high 
foreclosures. Select study sites to include range 
of market conditions and examine who is 
buying up distressed assets, the financial 
products and strategies they are using, their 
stated investment intentions, and their track 
records as property owners (How quickly are 
properties reoccupied? How often are they 
sold versus rented? How long until they are 
resold?) 
 Create typology of neighborhoods that could 
be used to guide policy approaches under 
different circumstances. 
 Review existing efforts to assemble data on 
vacant and abandoned properties and property 
transactions in distressed areas . 
What interventions hold the most promise for 
encouraging investment or otherwise stabilizing 
distressed neighborhoods? 
 Review experience with homeownership 
programs in distressed neighborhoods—how 
effective have they been at stimulating demand? 
Have homebuyers had positive financial and 
social outcomes? 
 Evaluate approaches adopted by NSP 
grantees—how cost effective have approaches 
been? Has there been demand for housing 
provided through NSP?  
 Evaluate HUD pilot on small-value 
rehabilitation loans. 
 Evaluate experience with previous home equity 
insurance programs with goal of making 
recommendations for a pilot program. 
 Assess potential for tax credits to serve this 
purpose drawing on based on experience with 
LIHTC and historic preservation credits—
What degree of subsidy would be required 
under different assumptions? What types of 
restrictions on use should be required for what 
period of time (e.g., quality of housing, 
affordability, income restrictions)? 
 Assess efforts to keep delinquent owners in 
homes either through refinance or transition 
into rental situation—such as efforts by Mercy 
Housing and CAPC. 
 Pilot survey to assess factors contributing to 
lack of demand by owner-occupants and 
identify approaches to remedy these 
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deficiencies (e.g., outdated housing types 
needing modification, inadequacy of schools or 
transportation infrastructure, neighborhood 
reputation, etc.). 
What are key obstacles to using mainstream financing 
in distressed areas? What do we know about 
magnitude of risks of different loan products? What 
types of guarantees may be needed to support lending? 
What additional sources of capital might be tapped for 
lending in these areas? 
 Conduct case studies in several market areas to 
identify barriers to using available financing 
(such as CLTV limits, nature of subsidies, non–
owner occupied status, lack of depository 
presence in neighborhood, etc.). Assess the 
potential for FHA or GSEs to provide financing 
for purchase of REO properties under specific 
conditions. 
 Review existing studies of default risks and loss 
severity rates of loans to investors in small 
properties, lease-purchase programs, rehab 
loan programs, and lending generally in 
distressed neighborhoods. Synthesize findings 
and identify gaps in research.  
 Analyze available loan-level data (from private 
sources, FHA, GSEs, or state HFAs) to fill in 
gaps in research on loan performance of above 
loan categories. 
What can we learn from past and current efforts to 
stabilize neighborhoods? 
 Review of existing evaluations of past and 
ongoing stabilization programs. 
 Conduct evaluations of identified aspects of 
NSP, NCST, or HUD Asset Control Area 
programs. 
 Assess efforts to purchase distressed loans or 
still-occupied REOs to maintain current owners 
in place. 
 Assess lease-to-own programs. 
 Assess obstacles to jump-starting land banks to 
handle most distressed abandoned and 
foreclosed properties. 
To what extent do challenges in appraising properties 
represent a barrier to lending in these areas? What 
innovations in the appraisal process might remedy 
these issues? 
 Review the existing literature assessing how a 
comparative sales approach to property 
appraisal may exacerbate both downward and 
upward trends in house prices.  
 Conduct case studies of the appraisal process 
in selected market areas reflecting a range of 
neighborhood market conditions. 
 Identify and review available information on 
alternative approaches to appraisals that would 
address shortcomings of current approaches. 
 Develop recommendations for pilot efforts to 
implement alternative appraisal approaches. 
Would the aggregation of small property ownership 
create economies of management and finance that 
would better support both higher quality and 
affordability of this housing? What public supports 
 Case studies of examples of pooled ownership, 
perhaps from the Asset Control Area program 
or efforts identified in responses to the Obama 
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would be needed to encourage this aggregation? administration’s request for information.  
 Review experience in other countries of 
scattered-site property management. 
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The Role of Mortgage Finance in Supporting Investments in Sustainable 
Housing 
There is significant scientific evidence that increases in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have 
contributed to global climate change, with serious consequences for the global ecosystem. As a result, 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gases have become an important policy concern. Since residential 
dwellings account for 22 percent of carbon dioxide emissions in the Unites States, reductions in energy 
uses in America’s homes offer an opportunity for substantial reductions in the national output of these 
gases (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] 2011). In fact, new housing already has a much lower 
carbon footprint than older units, and technological advances in building materials, insulation, heating 
and cooling systems, and appliances could reduce the footprint even further. The federal government 
estimates that energy-efficient retrofits to existing homes could lower energy use by up to 40 percent 
per unit, cutting annual greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 160 million metric tons by 2020. And 
even if pre-2000 homes are brought up only to the same efficiency level per square foot as post-2000 
homes in their regions, overall residential energy consumption would fall by 22.5 percent (Council on 
Environmental Quality 2009).  
Reducing energy use in homes may also be an important means of addressing concerns about housing 
affordability. Energy costs have come to account for a significant portion of total housing costs, 
particularly for low-income households. Utility costs for renter households in the bottom income 
quintile (earning up to $19,300) amount to more than a quarter of total housing costs in 2009, or nearly 
a fifth of household income (JCHS 2011). The share of households spending more than half their income 
worsened substantially over the past decade, and rising utility costs were an important contributor to 
this trend, rising 28 percent between 2002 and 2008 even as renter incomes fell. Clearly, efforts to 
improve the energy efficiency of housing need to be a part of policies aimed at improving housing 
affordability. 
In many cases, investments to increase the energy efficiency of new and existing housing have been 
found to generate sufficient savings over time to support these investments (GAO 2008). Yet, only a 
small share of existing or new housing have benefited from these energy saving investments (Gold and 
Nadel 2011). For instance, between 1995 and 2011 some 24 million new homes were built in the United 
States, yet only approximately 1 million incorporated sufficient energy-reducing components to qualify 
as Energy Star–rated homes.19  
In addition to the characteristics of the housing structure and its systems and appliances, the location of 
housing affects energy use through associated transportation use. In many areas of the country, high 
housing prices have led to a “drive till you qualify” approach for homebuyers, where more distant 
residential locations are chosen to meet mortgage underwriting guidelines but at the expense of much 
higher transportation costs—and energy use (Lipman 2005; Center for Neighborhood Technology 2010).  
Several barriers to greater efforts to improve residential energy efficiency may be addressed through 
greater public support for financing of these investments. Locationally efficient housing can also be 
supported through financing approaches that allow households to take on more mortgage debt than 
traditional underwriting if they choose homes that minimize their transportation costs. The market for 
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these investments in energy efficiency has developed substantially in recent years, but it is in many 
respects still an infant industry that could benefit from public intervention to help catalyze its 
maturation. Since the return on these investments is clouded by uncertainty, public action may be 
needed to provide subsidies or guarantees to address these uncertainties and provide an opportunity to 
gain valuable market experience. These public investments may also be needed to spur innovation in 
financial products and approaches that better match the timing of costs and benefits from these 
investments and to address equity concerns by allowing lower-income households to benefit from what 
would otherwise be prohibitively expensive improvements.  
In this section we present an overview of the key barriers to increasing investments in the energy 
efficiency of residential housing with an eye toward the challenges that are particularly pertinent to the 
extension of financing for this purpose. The discussion encompasses both owner-occupied and rental 
housing. While there are some significant differences between these market segments, there is also a 
fair amount of overlap in both challenges and solutions. Where there are important differences these 
will be noted.  
The purpose of the review is to identify specific roles that the government can play in helping increase 
the flow of financing for investments in residential energy efficiency, with the goal of identifying specific 
research needed to better inform policymaking. We do not focus on the issues specifically associated 
with subsidized housing, which present their own unique challenges, but rather on promoting 
investments in market-rate housing. The review also pays particular attention to HUD’s role in this area, 
but the findings may be of relevance to other federal and state agencies and other stakeholders.  
The first subsection below outlines the main barriers and challenges to greater investments to reduce 
residential energy consumption. Next, we examine the principal approaches that have been developed 
to extend financial support for improved energy efficiency. The section then concludes with a review of 
the questions that need to be addressed to inform policymaking in this area and identifies specific 
examples of research topics that may be most needed and appropriate for HUD to tackle.  
Challenges and Barriers  
Various factors may impede what otherwise might be greater efforts to both upgrade the existing 
housing stock and to improve the efficiency of new housing units. An understanding of these barriers is 
a necessary first step toward designing policy interventions to help develop this market. In some areas 
there is already a fair amount of understanding of the issues, while others are more ripe for further 
investigation. In some cases there are significant differences between the owner and rental markets in 
this regard. We have identified seven barriers that affect investment activity: 
 a lack of strong empirical evidence on the costs and financial returns on investments; 
 mismatch between timing of costs and benefits from investments; 
 the “split incentives” problem, related to who bears the costs of the investments and who reaps the 
benefits; 
 informational barriers and insufficient demand; 
 high transactional costs and other market frictions; 
 repayment risks for lenders; and 
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 need for subsidies and incentives. 
Empirical information on costs and financial returns from investments  
The starting point for making the case to both property owners and lenders about the financial 
justification for these investments is strong empirical evidence on actual energy pre- and post-
investment. Most estimates of the savings associated with these investments are just that—estimates 
based on energy ratings of the existing home and the anticipated upgrades. However, there are a 
number of reasons actual experience may differ from these estimates. Energy ratings may vary in their 
ability to gauge actual energy use. Reductions in the effective cost of energy may also spur consumers to 
increase their energy use. Finally, there may be interactions among changes made to buildings that 
affect the return from any individual investment.  
To substantiate the returns from energy savings investments, detailed information on energy use before 
and after improvements are made—including detailed information on the specific improvements—is 
needed across a range of property types and in a range of market circumstances. There are actually a 
number of initiatives aimed at developing this type of information, although mostly for multifamily 
housing. For example, systems have been developed by Bright Power, Inc., in partnership with Stewards 
for Affordable Housing for the Future (SAHF); the EPA has developed Energy Star Portfolio Manager; and 
a project begun in 2010 is funded by the Deutsche Bank Foundation in cooperation with Living Cities to 
develop a public database of several hundred retrofitted buildings in New York City. On the single-family 
side, one significant effort is led by a private firm Opower, which works with utility companies to gather 
energy use by residential customers and provide enhanced information to consumers to help them 
better manage their usage. If linked to information on energy savings investments and household 
characteristics, these data could provide a host of valuable insights on owner-occupied housing.  
An accurate energy efficiency rating of homes is also a necessary step for the value of these benefits to 
be capitalized into home values, since absent this information buyers cannot factor these savings into 
their offers. The extent to which the values of these investments are capitalized into property values will 
be an important factor for owners and lenders alike in deciding whether to pursue these options. Energy 
ratings are likely to be most advanced for new single-family homes, which may provide an opportunity 
to assess the impact of these ratings on values. 
But while a variety of information is collected, the challenge is to harness this information to develop 
reliable estimates of reduced energy use from upgrades to existing properties or additional features 
built into new housing. To achieve this, the information collected has to be standardized to include key 
metrics and has to be combined with information on housing and household characteristics to be useful 
for analytic purposes. A key challenge in making all these estimates is that individual household 
consumption of energy is to some degree idiosyncratic since households vary in the temperatures they 
aim to cool or heat their house to during different seasons and portions of weekdays and weekends. 
Thus, the most useful tools would allow users to input this information in a system that uses both 
average-degree days in their area and actual performance data on design, materials, and systems in a 
particular home, to calculate the energy costs of that particular home. This would allow them to 
comparison shop with knowledge of energy cost differences they would likely encounter among homes 
they are choosing among. Even then, though, future costs of energy are uncertain so savings depend on 
future prices that are impossible to predict with accuracy. 
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The government can play an important role in helping create standards for data collection, develop 
regulations that require utilities to both gather the data and to make it publicly available, and fund 
efforts to create databases that can support broader analysis on actual experience with both newly 
constructed and retrofitted properties.  
Mismatch between the timing of costs and benefits from investments  
As with many capital investments, one barrier to greater efforts to make housing more energy efficient 
is that high initial costs are only recouped over a long payback period. The cost savings from many 
energy-efficiency improvements will generally cover initial costs over 3 to 10 years, while “whole house” 
improvements are estimated to need 5 to 12 years to recoup the upfront investment.20 As a result, the 
availability of longer-term financing that matches payments to the realization of the savings is often 
needed to support these investments. This is particularly true for lower-income homeowners and 
owners of low-cost rental housing who are less likely to have the savings to cover the significant upfront 
costs. In some cases, property owners may lack sufficient wealth to fund the investment but may have 
sufficient income to cover debt payments over time. But in cases where the owner or rental property’s 
income cannot support the financing needed to make these additional investments, loan products that 
expand standard debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios may be essential. 
Split incentives problem 
Another barrier is the problem of split incentives, where the costs of investments are made by property 
owners but the benefits accrue to others—in the case of rental housing, the costs are borne by the 
property owner while the benefits may mostly accrue to tenants, while in the case of owner-occupied 
housing, the long-run benefits of these investments may be captured by subsequent owners of the 
property. The split incentive problem will be most evident for owner-occupied housing if the value of 
the investments are hard to assess and so not capitalized into the house value. Financing approaches 
that better align the distribution of the costs and benefits of energy improving investments can play an 
important role in fostering these activities. In the case of rental housing, this generally entails 
approaches that tie the repayment of the up-front costs to the utility costs for individual units. For 
owner-occupied housing, the approaches used can include either a surcharge on utility payments or 
property tax assessments. 
Informational barriers and insufficient demand  
One of the most significant barriers to the adoption of energy savings investments is a lack of demand 
by property owners. In part this reflects informational barriers—specifically a lack of awareness of both 
the potential financial and other gains from these investments and of the financing options available to 
support these investments (Fuller 2009). Indeed, a 2008 policy brief by the Federation of American 
Scientists examining use of FHA’s Energy Efficient Mortgage (EEM) program cited a lack of program 
awareness as the most prominent obstacle to greater program success (Gerarden 2008). But as 
documented by an extensive study by Lawrence Berkeley National Labs (LBNL), informational barriers 
may only be one of a host of factors that together limits demand for these investments by property 
owners (Fuller et al. 2010). Information is needed on the available energy-savings investments, the 
savings that would be expected from these investments, available financial assistance to support these 
investments, and qualified contractors and raters that need to be engaged to conduct this work.  
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The LBNL study highlighted the fact that providing information alone to make owners aware of these 
options is not enough to prompt action. Undertaking investments to upgrade a home’s systems can take 
considerable time and effort by the owner, and the potential financial savings may not be large enough 
to warrant the work required. Instead, owners need to be sold on reasons for addressing high energy 
consumption that go beyond financial savings they may realize, with potentially compelling reasons 
including health, comfort, energy security, and societal benefits.  
The study finds that important steps in fostering demand include focusing outreach to owners most 
likely to undertake these investments, tailoring the message to speak to the factors most likely to 
motivate these owners to take action, and engaging with local community organizations and contractors 
to execute this plan.  
While the LBNL study focused on homeowners, similar factors are likely cause multifamily owners to 
forgo energy improvements. The split incentive problem may limit demand for investments in these 
properties. But there may be other considerations that should motivate these owners to undertake 
these investments, such as providing a marketing advantage for these rental units. Information on the 
marketing value of these improvements might help persuade more multifamily owners to make energy 
improvements, but this of course is conditioned also on their ability to demonstrate energy savings to 
prospective tenants. 
In short, the mere creation of a financial product will not by itself be enough to spur demand. Making 
property owners aware of these products is an obvious first step, but when it comes to actually spurring 
action, awareness by itself will not be sufficient. Understanding the needs and interests of both owner-
occupied and rental property owners and tailoring both a financial product and a marketing effort to 
appeal to these interests is needed. It is important for policymakers to bear in mind the need to develop 
and support effective marketing efforts in addition to crafting the financial products themselves.  
Default risks 
The need for financial products aimed specifically at supporting energy-efficient investments in 
properties mostly arises in cases where the owner’s income or the property’s cash flow is not sufficient 
to support debt needed both to acquire and to upgrade the property within standard underwriting 
criteria. In these cases, lenders need to relax criteria related to both debt-to-income ratios (or debt 
service coverage ratios in the case of rental housing) and/or loan-to-value limits. Loans that are at the 
upper end of underwriting criteria will obviously face higher default risk. In the case of loans supporting 
energy savings investments, the additional leeway on standard criteria may increase the already higher 
default risk on these loans. The relaxed underwriting is generally predicated on anticipated savings on 
energy costs that will support the higher debt payments. But there are real risks that these savings will 
not materialize either because of overestimates of the benefits of the improvements, because energy 
consumption increases with reduced costs, or because energy prices rise above levels used at the time 
of underwriting. Given the higher risks of these loans, lenders may be reluctant to offer these products, 
or may only do so with risk premiums that make these investments less attractive. 
There is an obvious role for government to play in insuring against these risks as means of developing 
experience with these loans. There are various ways to mitigate risks, including insurance, guarantees, 
loan-tiering (where the government assumes a first loss position on a junior lien), and other risk-sharing 
mechanisms. Steps to gather better empirical evidence on the actual changes in energy use and 
associated impacts on property values will also help lenders assess these risks. So will models that test 
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sensitivity to forward energy costs on energy outlays and, hence, loan performance. But actual 
experience with lending programs is also of great value in documenting borrower behavior. 
Transaction costs and other frictions 
Transaction costs can pose additional financial barriers as many loan programs require home energy 
audits to document the improvements that are likely to result from the planned investments. These 
audits may also be used by owners to develop a rating that can be used in marketing their home. But 
the cost of comprehensive audits may themselves be a barrier. Residential Energy Services Network 
(RESNET) has developed the most widely used rating system, the Home Energy Rating System (HERS). 
RESNET has estimated that the average cost for rating a home using this system was $492 in 2009, and 
HUD estimates that the cost of a HERS report ranges from $300 to $800.21 While in many cases programs 
that require ratings will help cover these costs, this is not always the case.  
There are also costs associated with originating the loans themselves, which may be prohibitively high if 
loans lack sufficient volume to warrant developing staff expertise on these products. In the multifamily 
context, particularly for affordable housing, adding additional financing to a property will add an 
additional layer of complexity to what is already an intricate transaction. 
One way to help the industry develop to the point where greater scale economies may emerge is 
through the use of government subsidies to help cover transaction costs. Or initial efforts could focus on 
the high end of the market, which has greater ability to cover these costs, with the lower-end segment 
of the market developed later as scale economies emerge.  
Beyond the costs of the transaction, several other frictions can impede the development of this infant 
industry. A common concern is the lack of qualified auditors for assessing the home as well as 
remodelers qualified to conduct the work. Other stakeholders in the process, most notably real estate 
agents, may also have disincentives to support participation in these programs because of the added 
complexity of the transaction (Fasey 2000). To the extent that the steps entailed in applying for and 
meeting the requirements of financing programs slows the transaction and raises the risk that the deal 
will fall through, real estate agents might be expected to steer buyers away from these programs. On 
the other hand, if awareness of the benefits of energy efficiency become widespread enough, then 
homebuyers’ demands to see a home’s energy rating may become a selling point rather than a 
hindrance. 
In designing financing programs, it is important to take into account the way these transaction costs and 
other frictions may limit program participation. In some cases, these issues may be addressed through 
careful tailoring of program requirements to reduce these frictions. In other cases there may be a need 
for targeted use of subsidies to offset costs or provide incentives for stakeholders to promote the 
program. 
Need for subsidies and incentives 
For various reasons, financial subsidies are often needed to support energy-saving investments. 
Subsidies are commonly justified out of equity concerns, allowing low-income owners or low-cost rental 
housing to undertake investments that will make housing more affordable (Fuller 2009). Subsidies may 
be particularly important for rental property owners who may not capture much of the benefits 
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associated with lower utility costs for tenants in cases where they bear these costs. Subsidies may also 
be needed to cover transaction costs that reduce the financial return to owners or to help mitigate risks 
for both owners and lenders of unrealized savings. Finally, subsidies may be needed because the 
financial gains from these investments are simply too small to warrant the effort required by owners to 
upgrade their properties. Subsidies may be delivered in the form of incentives, such as tax credits that 
may be claimed over a specified time to reduce the cost of these investments and to give a spur to 
action. The incentives can be targeted to lower-income groups and can be justified by the social benefits 
that accrue from reduced energy consumption.  
One of the principal findings from the LBNL (2011) study of lessons learned from efforts over the past 30 
years to prompt owner investments to reduce energy consumption is the value of rebates and 
incentives in achieving high participation rates. While the study notes that deep subsidies cannot be 
counted on—and may not even be necessary given an effective marketing approach—at least in the 
short run, some form of subsidy and lower-cost financing may be needed to foster demand. 
One of the principal forms of incentives in recent years have been tax credits for investments in energy 
improvements. As part of efforts to stimulate the economy in 2009, the rules for the federal energy-
efficient improvement tax credit and the tax credit for home power production equipment were 
significantly expanded. The first credit is used to improve existing primary residences by installing 
energy-efficient windows, doors, roofing, and some home property like water heaters, while the second 
is claimed for solar panels, geothermal heat pumps, small wind turbines, and fuel cells. These credits 
appear to have provided a fairly substantial boost to these investments, with $5.9 billion claimed in 
2009.22  
Given the fiscal constraints evident at federal and state levels, it is important to make the most efficient 
use of available funding for subsidies. Integrating subsidies with financing products may help leverage 
this funding to reach more owners. However, as funding from temporary stimulus programs end and 
with mounting pressure on the federal government, federal subsidies are likely to decline in coming 
years, putting an increased premium on the efficient use of available funding. 
Public and Private Programs  
A wide variety of financial approaches and incentives have been developed to support investments in 
reducing residential energy use. The efforts provide an important starting point for developing a 
research agenda to inform future policy both by providing opportunities for learning from experiences 
to date and by cataloguing the available resources that could be used as building blocks for new or 
revised efforts going forward.  
Existing efforts can be grouped into three broad categories: loan products to support improvements in 
energy efficiency, alternative financing approaches that do not rely on owners obtaining a loan 
(sometimes referred to as off–balance sheet arrangements), and subsidy programs that provide either 
lower-cost financing or direct grants for these investments. A brief summary of existing efforts in each of 
these areas is presented below. 
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Loan programs  
For owner-occupants, several energy-efficient mortgage options are available through FHA and Fannie 
Mae. The primary feature of these loans are that they relax underwriting criteria to allow owners to take 
on more debt than would normally be allowed in order to either undertake energy savings remodeling 
projects or to acquire an energy-efficient home that would otherwise be out of financial reach. Energy 
improvements in a home translate to lower utility bills, thus enabling homeowners to pay higher 
mortgages to cover the costs of energy improvements in addition to their approved mortgage. The 
primary products are these four: 
 FHA Energy-Efficient Mortgage (EEM): These mortgage loans are insured by FHA and make 
mortgage credit available to purchase or refinance a residence by including the cost of energy 
improvements into the mortgage. Although the increased cost of energy-efficient improvements is 
not incorporated into the loan qualification calculations or the down payment calculation, the 
anticipated energy savings may be added to the borrower’s income in order to qualify him or her for 
a larger loan. To be eligible, the energy-efficient improvements must be cost effective: the total 
present value of anticipated energy savings from the improvements must be greater than the total 
cost of the improvements. Eligible expenses are the lesser of 5 percent of (a) the property’s value, 
(b) 115 percent of the median area price of a single-family unit, or (c) 150 percent of the conforming 
Freddie Mac limit. Additionally, the residence must be audited with a HERS report that estimates the 
cost of improvements and expected energy savings, the cost of which may be financed.23  
 FHA 203(k) Rehab Mortgage: These loans are not uniquely designed to facilitate energy efficiency 
improvements because they broadly address the rehabilitation, repair or modernization of a 
residence that a person wishes to purchase or refinance. Nonetheless, by integrating financing for 
energy-efficient improvements into the loan, the FHA 203(k) Rehab Mortgage simplifies financing 
and reduces overall improvement costs. All persons who can make mortgage payments are eligible. 
Loan qualification calculations include the costs of energy efficiency improvements, and the costs of 
the improvements are included in the down payment calculation. Eligible expenses must be at least 
$5,000 and cannot exceed $35,000. Additionally, homes must be inspected by a HUD-approved 
consultant to insure that the improvements have been completed.24 
 FHA PowerSaver: These loans allow qualifying homeowners to borrow up to $25,000 to make FHA- 
and DOE-approved energy efficiency improvements to their homes. These improvements span duct 
sealing to installation of a geothermal system, and the terms for the loan can be up to 20 years. 
Eligible borrowers include homeowners with credit scores of at least 660 and total debt-to-income 
ratios that do not exceed 45 percent. The combined loan-to-value ratio for Powersaver loans cannot 
exceed 100 percent. According to HUD, these loans may be of particular interest to homeowners 
with equity or homeowners who have paid off their mortgage and want to lower their energy bills 
by installing energy efficiency improvements.25 
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 Fannie Mae EEM: Akin to the FHA EEM loans, the Fannie Mae EEM adds the anticipated monthly 
energy savings to a borrower’s income so he or she qualifies for larger loans for purchasing or 
refinancing a house. The value of energy efficiency improvements is incorporated into the appraised 
value of the residence, and adjustments to the appraised value are capped at 5 percent for new 
construction and 15 percent for retrofits in existing structures. The loan also necessitates a HERS 
report to identify viable and cost-effective upgrades. After improvements have been made, a second 
HERS rating is undertaken. Finally, the additional loan amount for improvements is not included in 
the down payment calculation.26  
On the multifamily side, there are also different loans offered through FHA and the GSEs to support 
energy savings retrofits. The main examples are below:  
Loans for affordable housing 
 HUD Mark-to-Market Green Initiative: The Green Initiative builds on HUD’s Mark-to-Market 
program, which is implemented by the Office of Affordable Housing and Preservation and is 
designed to preserve affordable housing for renters while lowering the long-run costs of federal 
rental assistance. The Green Initiative augments this program by providing incentives to owners 
and purchasers to rehabilitate their rental properties using energy-efficient improvements. To 
achieve this, the program uses existing market mechanisms instead of outside capital 
investments. For instance, the program allows owners to slightly raise rents. All owners and 
purchasers who are already part of the M2M program and who have not implemented a 
Restructuring Commitment are eligible. To qualify, owners must undertake a Physical Condition 
Assessment (PCA) that identifies opportunities for energy efficiency improvements.27  
 Green Finance Plus: Building off the Fannie Mae/FHA Risk-Share program, this initiative 
provides financing for multifamily affordable housing properties that are 10 years or older and 
are in need of repairs or energy-efficient improvements. The program uses Fannie Mae’s 
Delegated Underwriting Service (DUS) requirements. The program requires a Green Property 
Needs Assessment (Green PNA) that identifies the property’s deferred capital needs and 
opportunities for improving energy and water usage. Additionally, a minimum of 5 percent of 
the refinance loan must be used for energy efficiency improvements, and all energy efficiency 
improvements must increase the property’s value and improve the property’s operations.28  
Loans for owners of market-rate multifamily homes 
 Freddie Mac/Community Preservation Corporation (CPC): The CPC, in conjunction with Freddie 
Mac, initiated a loan program for energy efficiency improvements and retrofits targeted at 
affordable multifamily buildings as well as low- and medium-income multifamily buildings. 
Financial backing comes from city and state government agencies in New York, as well as 
Deutsche Bank, Freddie Mac, HSBC, and Morgan Stanley. To qualify, borrowers need to conduct 
an energy audit that lists opportunities to enhance energy efficiency; these recommendations 
must be incorporated into the upgrading plans for the building. To keep the loans affordable, 
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several subsidies are also employed in concert with the loan, including: real estate tax 
abatement and exemptions, government grants, and low-cost secondary loans.29  
Alternative financing arrangements  
Various financing approaches have been developed to tap sources of funding other than direct loans to 
property owners and often deal with the issue of split incentives by tying the repayment for the 
investment to the property or individual rental unit and so ensuring that the beneficiary of the 
investment also bears the costs.  
 PACE: Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) financing programs are implemented by municipal 
governments by creating special tax assessment districts and issuing bonds to fund energy efficiency 
improvements in residential areas. Homeowners interested in energy-efficient improvements can 
opt into this municipal tax arrangement, in which case they are able to repay the cost of energy-
efficient improvements through an increased property tax. PACE programs are designed to 
overcome two hurdles to retrofitting homes with energy-efficient improvements. First, they reduce 
upfront costs and solve credit accessibility issues that could prevent a homeowner from installing 
energy efficiency improvements; second, they attach repayment for the energy efficiency 
improvements to the property itself; repayment for the cost of the improvements is added to the 
property’s tax bill and repaid over the course of 15–20 years. This plays the important role of 
attaching the costs of improvement to the property and not the owner. At the time of sale, the PACE 
lien is transferred to the new homeowner, thereby circumventing the difficult task of calculating the 
added value of energy improvements in overall home value. Despite its straightforward application, 
PACE programs are somewhat controversial. Property tax liens take precedence over mortgage 
liens, which means that in the instance of default, PACE liens must be repaid before mortgage liens. 
For this reason, PACE programs can increase risk for mortgage lenders. On May 5, 2010, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac stated that PACE programs violate their mortgage regulations, thus complicating 
their widespread adoption.30 
 ESCOs: Energy Savings Companies (ESCOs) primarily work with large clients to install energy-efficient 
improvements to large government and commercial buildings. ESCOs also work with some 
multifamily buildings and public housing agencies, which make up approximately 5 percent of their 
market. ESCOs themselves pay for the upfront costs of capital improvements and energy audits, and 
recoup these costs over the course of 7 to 20 years through one of two financial arrangements with 
their client: guaranteed savings contracts or shared savings agreements. In a guaranteed savings 
contract, the client agrees to repay the costs of the improvements through a fixed-payment 
schedule based on the estimated energy savings from the improvements. The energy savings should 
be greater than or equal to the fixed payments; oftentimes ESCOs will pay the difference if the 
retrofits do not provide the anticipated energy savings. A shared savings agreement divides the 
savings from retrofits between the ESCO and the contracting organization. The ESCO therefore has a 
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strong incentive to ensure that the retrofits engender cost savings. Once the cost of improvements 
has been paid off in either contract, the client organization enjoys the full savings of the energy 
efficiency improvements.31 
Subsidy programs 
Several Department of Energy programs make funding available to states and localities specifically to 
support energy-saving investments in residential property. There may be opportunities to coordinate 
the resources of these programs with financial tools, such as by combining grants with loans to tackle 
larger projects or by providing funding for marketing or training. A brief overview of the primary federal 
funding sources for supporting energy saving investments in homes follows.  
 Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant (EECBG): In 2007, the EECBGs were funded with 
$3.2 billion from ARRA; $2.7 billion has been distributed to states and eligible communities using an 
allocation formula, and $454 million will be distributed through the Retrofit Ramp-Up program for 
neighborhood energy retrofits and the General Innovation Fund, which funds smaller projects 
similarly targeted at innovative energy initiatives for communities. The grant functions like HUD’s 
Community Development Block Grants: cities and communities apply for and administer grants to 
undertake energy efficiency projects that reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions. Many projects can qualify for an EECBG, but projects targeted at low- and middle-income 
households may be prioritized.32 
 Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP): The WAP subsidizes energy efficiency improvements in 
low income households in single-family and some multifamily residences. The Department of 
Energy, via the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, distributes funds to state agencies 
that determine local eligibility requirements, conduct energy audits, and contract local businesses to 
weatherize homes. In the past 33 years, 6.4 million households have been weatherized under the 
WAP, and annual energy bills in these homes have been reduced by an average of $437. Recently, 
the ARRA expanded the program by allocating $5 billion for weatherization services, broadening 
program eligibility to include households at or below 200 percent of the poverty level (previously 
150 percent), and increasing average household assistance from $2,500 to a maximum of $6,500.33 
 State Energy Program (SEP): A program administered by the Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy at the Department of Energy, the SEP allocates grants to states for energy-
efficient and renewable energy projects with the stipulation that states match the grants with 20 
percent of their own funds. State agencies distribute and administer the projects, but recent ARRA 
funding administered by the DOE directs states to develop and employ residential building energy 
codes and carry out “shovel-ready projects,” which often include residential energy efficiency 
improvement programs.34  
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 Community Development Block Grants (CDBG)/Home Program: Both these programs are 
administered by HUD and implemented by the Office of Community Planning and Development; 
neither is exclusively for energy efficiency improvements. CDBGs allocate federal funds to states and 
communities to undertake a range of development projects spanning neighborhood revitalization to 
residential energy efficiency improvements. The Home program provides approximately $2 billion 
annually in federal block grants to states and communities specifically for affordable housing and 
low-income households. States are eligible for up to $3 million in funds and local jurisdictions qualify 
for up to $500,000. In both the CDBG and Home programs, funding can be applied to a range of 
projects, including energy-efficient improvements and retrofits for single- and multifamily homes. 
HUD cannot require that homes be built to Energy Star standards through this funding arrangement, 
but in 2007 a Home report posted that 4,260—roughly 17 percent of all Home-funded units—were 
Energy Star certified.35 
Key Questions for Policymakers 
The research needed to inform policies aimed at supporting financing for energy savings investments in 
residential housing largely revolves around the key barriers and challenges outlined above. This section 
outlines general research topics in this area along with some ideas for specific research projects that 
could be good starting points. Many of these topics have actually been the subject of intensive study by 
a wide range of research and advocacy organizations seeking ways to reduce the nation’s energy 
consumption and production of greenhouse gases. As a result, for a number of these issues a good 
starting point would be to conduct a literature review to collect and synthesize the findings that have 
relevance for HUD and other organizations with a housing finance perspective.  
What do we know about the actual degree of savings from investments of different 
types?  
There is a fair amount of information and tools available to assess the potential savings from new and 
upgraded residential systems and appliances. A scan of available resources and assessments of these 
resources may be a useful starting point.  
Solid information on the extent of actual energy savings from different types of investments is also 
needed to inform property owners about real opportunities for savings, to provide a foundation for 
determining the level of up-front financing that can be supported by savings, and to identify the degree 
of subsidization that may be needed to provide owners with appropriate financial incentive to make 
these investments. While there are established methodologies for estimating potential savings based on 
energy ratings of existing homes and new systems, there is a general lack of systematic information on 
energy use and housing characteristics representing a cross section of the housing stock. There are a 
number of ongoing initiatives to gather information on large portfolios of multifamily housing, but less 
on owner-occupied housing or market-rate rentals. With additional data collected by various nonprofit 
organizations on multifamily housing, there will be opportunities going forward to analyze these data—
if they can be obtained. One particularly rich area for study would be the fairly substantial experience of 
some public housing authorities with ESCOs, if these data could be obtained. 
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A related line of study is an examination of the delinquency and default performance of EEMs over time. 
These loans allow for relaxed underwriting on the assumption that future savings will offset these higher 
costs. A comparison of the actual performance of these loans over time compared to otherwise similar 
borrowers would indicate whether these loans do pose increased risks. 
What is the impact of enhanced energy efficiency on property values and rents?  
The impact of greater energy efficiency improvements on property values is also an important 
consideration for both owners and lenders in deciding whether to make these investments. In practical 
terms, the question generally boils down to what impact energy ratings have on property values since 
there needs to be some measure of the energy efficiency of a home in order for prospective buyers to 
factor this into their price. The estimated impact of these ratings will obviously depend on the 
usefulness of the rating as well as the understanding of the rating by buyers. To date there have been 
few systematic studies of this issue in the United States context, with only a handful of recent studies 
examining energy the impact of energy ratings on house values (Griffin and Kaufman 2009; Carliner, 
Bowles, and Nebbia 2008). Earlier studies examined the association between lower utility costs and 
house values, but these suffered from various methodological issues that make it difficult to draw 
conclusions (see Laquatra et al. 2002 for a review of these earlier studies). Additional studies of property 
value impacts are needed, potentially including additional studies on the degree to which potential 
buyers are aware of and know how to interpret available energy ratings. 
While energy ratings are one means of encouraging a market valuation of energy efficiency, there may 
also be changes that could be implemented into property appraisal process to take energy efficiency 
into account in estimating values. An exploratory study could investigate how this might be 
accomplished with regard to both owner and rental property valuations. 
What have been the principal impediments to greater demand for energy efficiency 
upgrades by property owners?  
One of the barriers that has been identified to greater uptake of opportunities for upgrading homes 
energy efficiency is a lack of awareness by property owners of the savings that could be generated 
and/or the financing products or subsidies available to support these investments. Other studies suggest 
that a lack of awareness may not be as important as a lack of sufficient motivation on the part of owners 
to pursue these activities—that is, factors other than cost savings, such as health or social benefits, may 
be needed to tip the scales in favor of the owner taking action. Lessons from behavioral economics may 
provide a valuable frame for reviewing ways to encourage greater action by property owners. For 
example, better framing of these choices may be needed to overcome inertia in owners taking action.36 
There has been a variety of research on this topic, but there is likely more that could be done, 
specifically with regard to demand for specific financial products. A literature review on what is known 
about demand for energy efficiency upgrades might be a necessary starting point.  
Research in this area could also include an evaluation of available tools that help consumers understand 
the benefits of homes that are energy efficient and how effective they are at addressing factors that 
motivate owners to upgrade their homes or choose a new home that is more energy efficient. An 
obvious area to test these interventions is through existing programs that provide education and advice 
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to first-time homebuyers. Existing curriculum and counseling methods could be adapted to include 
information on the importance of considering the energy efficiency of homes during the search process, 
and how to gather the information needed to evaluate homes on these criteria.  
What can be learned from existing programs about approaches that hold the most 
promise for addressing the principal barriers to greater investment in improved 
residential energy efficiency? What can we learn from experiences in other 
countries?  
FHA and Fannie Mae have offered various loan programs to support the upgrading or purchase of 
energy-efficient housing. There are also a wide variety of efforts by state governments and utilities to 
help finance energy-efficient housing. For example, as of late 2011 the Database for State Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiencies (www.dsireusa.org) listed 227 different state-level loan programs to support 
energy-efficient housing. These programs offer a rich set of experiences that can be studied to identify 
lessons learned about approaches that have succeeded or failed in supporting these investments. For 
example, how successful have incentives used in the past been in the number and impact of energy 
improvements made? How widely used have loan programs been, how have they performed, and what 
do industry and advocacy organizations say is impeding their use? What lessons can we learn from this 
experience that can be used to improve these programs or identify possible new program needs? 
A starting point would be to review existing studies to document what has been learned and what 
programs and issues have not been subject to much study. Fuller (2009) provides this type of review of 
18 programs from the United States and Canada, but clearly more could be done to mine existing 
experience with these programs. Given that financing products and approaches are still being 
developed, at this stage there is likely to be a need for both process and outcome studies that assess 
experience in implementing these programs and documenting the outcomes realized. In some cases, 
there may be sufficient experience to conduct rigorous quantitative analysis of outcomes, but there is 
also likely a need for qualitative research as well.  
One particular area of study might be on the experience with locationally efficient mortgages (LEM). 
Fannie Mae offered this product for a time but no longer does. What were the obstacles to acceptance 
of this product? Was it limited demand? Or were the problems related to the fact that employment 
locations are not fixed and so there is no guarantee that the home will remain locationally efficient for 
the borrower?  
Are there opportunities to leverage existing subsidies to spur greater investment 
activity through financing programs?  
A variety of grant programs provide funding for residential investments or complimentary activities. 
Financing programs could be designed to either leverage or compliment these funding sources. For 
example, EECBG funding can be used for technical assistance and the development of conservation 
strategies, which could be tapped to develop marketing and supportive services for financing programs. 
Or a lending program could be designed to complement the DOE’s weatherization program, which 
provides grants of up to $6,500 for eligible low-income households. Financing programs could offer a 
shallower subsidy to households ineligible for the weatherization grants. Opportunities for coordinating 
activities under different programs—and to identify gaps in coverage across existing programs—might 
be identified through case studies of state and local programs.  
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Table 4: Specific Research Ideas 
Research questions Potential research projects 
What do we know about actual degree of savings from 
investments of different types? 
 Review of assessments of return on 
investments in improved energy efficiency and 
available consumer tools. 
 Gather more systematic data on owner-
occupied homes through FHA programs. 
 Review available energy assessment tools 
including DOE Residential Retrofit Standards 
and methods for formulating and implementing 
residential building codes. 
 Gather and analyze data on returns to ESCO 
investments in public housing authorities. 
What is impact of enhanced energy efficiency on 
property values?  
 Analysis of impact of different means of 
assessing energy efficiency in different market 
contexts. 
What have been the principal impediments to greater 
demand for energy efficiency upgrades by property 
owners?  
 Literature review of research on consumer 
demand for energy-efficient housing 
investments for both owners and renters. 
 Design and test survey to fill in gaps on 
consumer preferences and shopping behaviors. 
 Evaluate available tools that help consumers 
understand the benefits of homes that are 
energy efficient. 
 Assess potential for behavioral economic 
approaches to inducing consumer investments 
in energy savings.  
 Develop and pilot additions to housing 
counseling curriculum to encourage 
consideration of energy efficiency issues in 
choosing a home. 
What can be learned from existing programs about 
approaches that hold the most promise for addressing 
principal barriers? 
 Conduct a meta review of existing studies 
assessing experience with loan programs and 
financial incentives for investing in energy-
efficient housing. 
 Targeted assessment of experience with 
existing programs with a particular emphasis on 
what have been obstacles to greater demand. 
 Review experience in other countries with 
efforts to promote residential energy efficiency 
Are there opportunities to leverage existing subsidies 
to spur greater investment activity through financing 
programs? 
 Case studies of state and local programs 
combining assistance programs 
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